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PROSPECTIVELY CURING INEQUITABLE
CONDUCT THROUGH REISSUE:
RECONSIDERING A "WELL-SETTLED
PRINCIPLE"
Daniel A. Kleint
Abstract
Inequitable conduct is an equitable doctrine that renders a
patent unenforceable upon a finding that the patentee has breached
the duty of candor and good faith owed to the US. Patent and
Trademark Office during prosecution of a patent application. In
Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharmaceuticals, the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that Aventis's asserted patent
was unenforceable for inequitable conduct. However, prior to filing
its infringement action, Aventis had filed an application to reissue its
patent, and in its reissue application had disavowed reliance on the
very statements on which the assertion of inequitable conduct was
based. The reissue patent issued prior to the trial court's judgment,
but the court simply extended the judgment of unenforceability of the
original patent to the reissue patent. The Federal Circuit affirmed,
citing the "well-settled principle" that a reissue proceeding cannot
rehabilitate a patent held to be unenforceable due to inequitable
conduct.
The Aventis court dispensed with the significance of the reissue
patent with no more than a footnote. However, a careful reading of
the opinions cited by the court reveals that the majority improperly
relied on dicta to announce a principle broader than the precedent
warrants. The Federal Circuit's statements on this issue in earlier,
uncited opinions similarly demonstrate a misreading of precedent.
Moreover, not only is the public interest served by allowing patentees
to prospectively cure "inequitable" conduct in post-grant
proceedings, but the Aventis rule may actually encourage behavior
t J.D., Duke University School of Law, 2001; Patent Counsel at Millennium: The
Takeda Oncology Company. The views expressed herein are those of the author alone and are
not attributable to Millennium or any affiliated entity. The author thanks Matthew J. Dowd for
his careful review of this manuscript.
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the law should work to dissuade. Consideration of the timing of
relevant events leads to a framework in which patentees are permitted
to employ reissue to cure conduct-specifically, omissions and
misrepresentations-that would otherwise be judged inequitable
conduct, under limited circumstances. Application of the proposed
analysis might have lead to a different result in Aventis and other
cases, and should lead to a more just result for both the public and
the patentee in future actions. *
I. INTRODUCTION
Inequitable conduct is an equitable doctrine that renders a patent
unenforceable upon a finding that the patentee has breached the duty
of candor and good faith owed to the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office ("PTO") during prosecution of a patent application.' The duty
of candor includes the requirement to submit to the PTO information
material to patentability of a pending claim, 2 and a holding of
inequitable conduct can be based on the failure to disclose such
information to the PTO, if the applicant acted with deceptive intent.3
Moreover, the duty is owed not only by the applicant, i.e., the named
inventor(s), but also by "[e]ach attorney or agent who prepares or
prosecutes the application; and [e]very other person who is
substantively involved in the preparation or prosecution of the
application and who is associated with the inventor, with the assignee
or with anyone to whom there is an obligation to assign the
application."A
* While this article was in press, legislation was proposed that included a supplementary
(re)examination procedure whereby art submitted to the PTO and determined to have no effect
on patentability would be precluded from serving as the basis of an inequitable conduct claim,
provided the reexamination concluded prior to litigation. See
http://judiciary.senate.gov/legislation/upload/PatentReformAmendment.pdf, accessed May 11,
2010.
1. For discussions of the origin and evolution of the doctrine, see Robert J. Goldman,
Evolution of the Inequitable Conduct Defense in Patent Litigation, 7 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 37
(1993); Robert A. Migliorini, Lessons for Avoiding Inequitable Conduct and Prosecution
Laches in Patent Prosecution and Litigation, 46 IDEA 221, 222-32 (2006).
2. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2009).
3. "A breach of [the duty of candor] may constitute inequitable conduct, which can arise
from an affirmative misrepresentation of a material fact, failure to disclose material information,
or submission of false material information, coupled with an intent to deceive or mislead the
PTO." Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharm., 438 F.3d 1123, 1128 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citations
omitted).
4. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(c) (2009).
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In Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharmaceuticals, the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's
holding that Aventis's asserted patent was unenforceable for
inequitable conduct.5 The conduct in question consisted of the failure
to disclose certain information concerning data and associated
assertions contained in the patent's specification and in declarations
6
submitted during prosecution. Finding these omissions intentional,
and that but for the intentional omissions the patent would likely not
have issued, the district court held the patent unenforceable.
Prior to filing its infringement action, Aventis filed an
application to reissue its patent.8 In its reissue application, Aventis
expressly disavowed reliance on all arguments proffered during
prosecution of the original patent that were based on the data in
question.9 The reissue patent issued one day before the district court's
order, and the court extended the judgment of unenforceability of the
original patent to the reissue patent.10 The Federal Circuit affirmed,
citing the "well-settled principle . . . that a reissue proceeding cannot
rehabilitate a patent held to be unenforceable due to inequitable
conduct.""
This article examines the Aventis court's opinion that the
judgment of unenforceability of the original patent automatically
extended to the reissue patent, and concludes that the court was in
error. Section II of the article reviews the facts and critiques the
reasoning behind the holding of inequitable conduct in Aventis.
Section III considers under what circumstances a patentee should be
able to prospectively cure conduct that otherwise would be held
inequitable conduct. Section IV examines how the outcome might
have been different in Aventis and other cases had the court followed
this article's reasoning. Section V briefly summarizes the conclusions
drawn.
5. Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 525 F.3d 1334, 1349 (Fed. Cir.
2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2053 (2009).
6. See id. at 1340-1341.
7. Id. at 1343.
8. See Aventis Pharm. v. Amphastar Pharm., 176 F. App'x. 117, 119 n.1, 2006 WL
925278 at *2 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
9. Id.; see also infra note 3 1.
10. Aventis, 525 F.3d at 1341 n.6.
11. Id.
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II. INEQUITABLE CONDUCT IN A VENTIS V. AMPHASTAR
A. The '618 Patent
Aventis markets the drug LOVENOX®, useful for preventing
thromboses (blood clotting) while minimizing the possibility of
hemorrhaging, especially during high-risk surgery.12 Amphastar and
Teva each filed an Abbreviated New Drug Application ("ANDA") in
order to obtain approval from the Food and Drug Administration
("FDA") to market a generic version of LOVENOX®.13 Consequently,
Aventis sued both parties for infringement of U.S. Patent
No. 5,389,618 ("the '618 patent"), listed in the FDA's Orange Book
for LOVENOX. 14
The defendants' ANDAs contained a paragraph IV certification 5
alleging, inter alia, that the '618 patent was unenforceable due to
inequitable conduct.16 The assertion of inequitable conduct (with
which the district court agreed) was premised on Example 6 of the
'618 patent's specification and statements concerning Example 6 by
declarant Dr. Andr6 Uzan.17 The '618 patent is directed to a
composition comprising low molecular weight heparins
("LMWHs")." Example 6, prepared with the assistance of Dr. Uzan,
"illustrates the increase in stability, in vivo, of the mixtures of the
invention, expressed by their plasma half-life." 9 During prosecution
of the '618 patent, the Examiner required Aventis to provide evidence
of some unexpected or unobvious property of the claimed
composition in order to overcome the PTO's obviousness rejection.20
Relying on Example 6, Aventis argued that the claimed LMWHs
exhibit a significantly longer half-life than formulations prepared
according to cited European Patent No. 40,144 ("EP '144).21 During
prosecution, Dr. Uzan additionally submitted two declarations
12. Id. at 1337.
13. Id. at 1340.
14. Id. at 1340-41.
15. The statutory scheme governing patent challenges by prospective generic drug
manufacturers has been described elsewhere. See, e.g., Teva Pharm. v. Pfizer, 395 F.3d 1324,
1327-28 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
16. Aventis, 525 F.3d at 1340-41.
17. See id. at 1346 n.8.
18. Id. at 1337.
19. Id. at 1338.
20. Id. The PTO also rejected the claims as anticipated, and Example 6 was relied on in
part to overcome this rejection as well. Id. at 1339.
21. Id. at 1338.
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containing assertions of superior half-life of the claimed composition
compared to the EP '144 composition.22 Following the second
declaration, the application was allowed and the '618 patent was
granted.23
The defendants' allegation of inequitable conduct focused on Dr.
Uzan's failure to disclose that the half-life studies comparing the
claimed composition to the EP '144 composition were conducted at
different doses.2 4 In an earlier decision, the Federal Circuit had agreed
that the omission was material to patentability,25 but remanded to the
district court to determine whether there was deceptive intent by
Aventis in failing to disclose the difference in dosages. 26 On remand,
the district court again found the intent to deceive the PTO required to
sustain the holding of inequitable conduct.27 The court rejected
Aventis's explanations for Dr. Uzan's failure to disclose the dose of
the EP '144 composition in the half-life comparisons, namely, that
comparison of half-lives at different doses was reasonable, and that
the failure to disclose was inadvertent.28 Holding that the district court
did not clearly err in finding deceptive intent, and rejecting other
explanations proffered by Aventis on appeal, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the judgment of unenforceability for inequitable conduct.29
B. The Re '743 Patent
Prior to filing its action for infringement, Aventis filed an
application to reissue the '618 patent.30 The reissue application
expressly disavowed any reliance on Example 6 and the portions of
22. Id. at 1339-40.
23. Id. at 1340.
24. Id. at 1341.
25. "Aventis never disclosed during prosecution that it derived the half-life data for the
EP 40,144 LMWH at a 60 mg dose. The half-life comparisons were highly material to
patentability.... The failure to disclose ... denied the examiner an opportunity to determine
whether the differences in half-lives between the Debrie and EP 40,144 compounds were
significant. Therefore, an omission that would have revealed that the difference in half-lives was
actually much smaller was material to patentability.. . . Given the centrality of the differences in
half-lives to patentability, by failing to disclose the dosage of the 60 mg compound or to
disclose that the difference in half-lives at the same dosage was actually lower, Aventis failed to
disclose material information to the PTO." Aventis Pharm. v. Amphastar Pharm., 176 F. App'x.
117, 120, 2006 WL 925278 at *3 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
26. Aventis, 525 F.3d at 1337.
27. Id. at 1342-43.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1349.
30. See Aventis, 176 F. Appx. at 119 n.1, 2006 WL 925278 at *2 n.1.
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Dr. Uzan's declarations relating to Example 6.3 The PTO allowed the
application, presumably without relying on the half-life data from
Example 6.32 One day before the district court issued its order holding
the '618 patent unenforceable, Aventis's reissue application issued as
U.S. Patent No. Re 38,743 ("the Re'743 patent").3 The district court
granted Aventis's motion to substitute the Re'743 patent for the
'618 patent, and amended its holding of unenforceability of the
'618 patent to apply to the Re'743 patent.34 The Federal Circuit
approved of the district court's decision, stating that "[i]n so holding,
the district court relied on the well-settled principle articulated in
Hoffman-La Roche Inc. v. Lemmon Co. that a reissue proceeding
cannot rehabilitate a patent held to be unenforceable due to
inequitable conduct."35
C. The Majority's Reasoning
The Aventis majority cited only one case-Hoffinan-La Roche,
Inc. v. Lemmon Co.-to support the "well-settled principle" that a
reissue proceeding cannot rehabilitate a patent held to be
unenforceable due to inequitable conduct.3 6 In Hoffman-La Roche, the
Federal Circuit considered an appeal from the holding of
unenforceability for inequitable conduct of Hoffman-La Roche's U.S.
Patent No. Re 28,636 ("the Re'636 patent"). The district court had
held that inequitable conduct had been committed both during
prosecution of the original patent and during prosecution of the
Re'636 patent.38 During the original prosecution, certain references
deemed material had not been submitted to the PTO, references of
31. Prior to any examination, the Applicant stated: "Upon filing the reissue application,
Applicant deleted Example 6 from the specification. Example 6, providing half-life results from
clinical studies using low molecular weight heparin compositions in human volunteers, appeared
to contain several errors. . . . Further investigation has revealed that the study recited in 1 3 of
Example 6 may not have involved a mixture outside the scope of the claims. For at least those
reasons, Applicant is not relying on Example 6 or any statement or argument based on
Example 6 in the prosecution of the '618 patent, including portions of the [two] Uzan
declarations relating to Example 6." U.S. Patent Appl. No. 10/430,435, Preliminary
Amendment, filed Nov. 26, 2003.
32. See U.S. Patent Appl. No. 10/430,435, Notice of Allowance and Fee(s) Due, mailed
Dec. 16, 2004.
33. Aventis, 525 F.3d at 1341 n.6.
34. Id.
35. Id. (citations omitted).
36. See id.
37. See Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Lemmon Co., 906 F.2d 684 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
38. Id. at 688.
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which the examiner was aware during reissue prosecution.3 9 On
reissue, the failure to disclose information concerning the relationship
between Hoffman-La Roche and its parent company, and concerning
procedures they employed, were held to be material omissions. 4 0 The
Federal Circuit held that the district court had applied the incorrect
standard in its determination that there was intent to deceive with
respect to both prosecutions.4 ' Accordingly, the court vacated the
judgment of inequitable conduct and remanded to the district court to
decide whether there was intent to deceive using the proper
standard.42
The court then continued:
If the district judge finds that there was inequitable conduct during
the original patent prosecution, then this court directs the district
judge's attention to footnote 7 in Hewlett-Packard that said:
it is well settled that, in the reverse case of inequitable
conduct during prosecution of the original application, reissue
is not available to obtain new claims and thereby rehabilitate
the patent. (citation omitted) (reissue unavailable to rescue
patentee who committed inequitable conduct during original
prosecution.)
Hewlett-Packard, 882 F.2d at 1563-64 n.7, 11 USPQ2d at 1756
n.7. Thus, if the district court finds that there was inequitable
conduct in the prosecution of the original patent then the reissue
patent is invalid and an appropriate judgment should be entered. 43
Because at this point there was no longer a holding of inequitable
conduct to review, the court's direction constitutes dictum. That fact
notwithstanding, the cited passage stands as a clear statement of the
court's understanding of the ability-or, rather, the lack of ability-to
utilize reissue to prospectively cure a material omission that later
gives rise to a holding of inequitable conduct, particularly in view of
the fact that the references withheld during original prosecution were
known to the examiner during reissue. According to the court's
citation above, that understanding arose from its own analysis in
Hewlett-Packard.
39. Id. at 687.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 688.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 688-89 (alteration in original).
360 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 26
In Hewlett-Packard, the Federal Circuit considered the district
court's holding that Bausch & Lomb's reissue patent was
unenforceable for inequitable conduct.44 In that case the PTO had
rejected the reissue application as improper for specifying neither an
error warranting reissue nor how the error occurred. 4 5 Hewlett-
Packard based its allegation of inequitable conduct on two affidavits
submitted to overcome this rejection by the patent agent who
prosecuted Bausch & Lomb's original patent application.46
Thus, there was no allegation in Hewlett-Packard that
inequitable conduct had been committed during prosecution of the
original patent. Rather, the court addressed whether the district court
had applied the correct legal standard in holding that Bausch & Lomb
had committed inequitable conduct during prosecution of the reissue
application, and whether all claims of the reissue patent would be held
unenforceable if inequitable conduct were found on remand.4 7 On
these issues the court held that "with respect to inequitable conduct, it
is appropriate to give the same extent of unenforceability to a reissue
patent as to an original patent and that the same level of misconduct is
required in both instances."" It is this sentence to which the court
attached footnote 7, above, on which the Hoffman-La Roche court
relied. However, because Hewlett-Packard considered only
inequitable conduct committed during reissue prosecution, the
statement in the vaunted footnote is mere dictum with respect to the
applicant's conduct during prosecution of the original patent. To find
the basis for this statement one must look to the case whose citation
was omitted by the Hoffman-La Roche court in its reproduction of
footnote 7.
In In re Clark, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
considered a decision from the PTO Board of Appeals affirming the
examiner's rejection of all the claims remaining in a reissue
application.49 Clark had filed the reissue application after the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that he had not satisfied his duty
of disclosure to the PTO because he withheld material prior art,
namely, a document referred to as the "Stow reference."50 The
44. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 882 F.2d 1556, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
45. Id. at 1559.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1558, 1562-64.
48. Id. at 1563.
49. See In re Clark, 522 F.2d 623 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
50. Id. at 624.
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examiner considered this fact to be sufficient basis for determining
that the application did not satisfy the requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 251
that any defect to be corrected in the patent occur without deceptive
intent.5' Additionally, the examiner did not consider the statement in
the reissue oath-"to amend certain claims in order to make more
explicit structural features already implicit in those claims"-to be a
proper basis for seeking reissue. 2
The Clark court made abundantly clear the narrow scope of their
inquiry: "[t]his opinion is sharply focused on the single question of
whether appellant has presented a good case for reissue of his patent
under § 251.,53 Unable to identify in the reissue declaration any
assertion of defectiveness in the specification, drawing or claims, the
court considered whether the failure to disclose the Stow reference
constituted a proper basis for reissue.54 More specifically, the court
considered whether the holding of unenforceability for inequitable
conduct based on the failure to disclose the Stow reference was a
proper basis for reissue:
Appellant has pointed to no error on his part but only to alleged
error by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.... The failure to
disclose Stow et al. to the examiner resulted in the Fifth Circuit
deeming appellant's patent to be invalid, and it is this act, whether
the Fifth Circuit was correct or not, which impelled appellant to
seek a reissue.ss
The fact that the reissue application had been filed after the Fifth
Circuit's decision was critical to the Clark court's holding:
Reissue is not available to rescue a patentee who had presented
claims limited to avoid particular prior art and then had failed to
disclose that prior art (the examiner not having cited it) after that
failure to disclose has resulted in the invalidating of the claims.
The sole goal of appellant in soliciting a reissue is to have the
examiner re-examine his claims in light of the reference he
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 625.
54. Id. at 626.
55. Id. (emphasis in original). Here and below, in contemporary parlance the court should
be understood to mean unenforceability when the opinion refers to invalidity resulting from
breach of the duty of candor. See J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex, Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1560-61
(Fed. Cir. 1984).
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originally failed to disclose in order, apparently, to relieve him of
the consequences of his failure.56
Lest there be any doubt as to that criticality, the court clarified: "This
case does not require us to decide, and we do not decide, whether it is
proper to seek reissue in order to disclose uncited prior art where no
holding of invalidity has arisen from the patentee's failure to have
disclosed the prior art."57
Thus, as the Aventis majority stated, a reissue proceeding cannot
rehabilitate a patent held to be unenforceable due to inequitable
conduct. However, because Aventis's application for reissue was filed
prior to the district court's judgment-and, in fact, the reissue patent
issued before the judgment was rendered-this "well-settled
principle," as articulated in Clark, simply does not address, let alone
decide, the propriety of the court's refusal to consider whether the
reissue application cured the material omission on which the holding
of inequitable conduct was based.
1II. CONSIDERATION OF REISSUE TO CURE CONDUCT DEEMED
INEQUITABLE
As the Aventis majority noted, it is indeed a well-settled
principle that one cannot utilize reissue to rehabilitate a patent held
unenforceable due to inequitable conduct. Thus, the title of this article
is arguably misleading insofar as "inequitable conduct"-which is not
merely conduct but rather a court's judgment regarding a patentee's
conduct 58-cannot be cured. However, the question presented to, but
not addressed by, the Aventis court was whether reissue may be used
prospectively, i.e., prior to judgment, to cure conduct that would
otherwise later be deemed to have been inequitable. Addressing this
question is the subject of the present section.
A. Materiality
As the Federal Circuit has explained, there are two prongs of
inquiry into an allegation of inequitable conduct: materiality and
56. Clark, 522 F.2d at 627 (emphasis added).
57. Id. at 627 n.4 (emphasis added).
58. "Once the requisite levels of materiality and intent have been proven, a district court
must balance the equities to determine whether the patentee has committed inequitable conduct
that warrants holding the patent unenforceable." Monsanto Co. v. Bayer Bioscience N.V., 514
F.3d 1229, 1234 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (emphasis added).
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intent.59 During the past sixty years, the courts have articulated five
different tests of materiality: (1) the objective "but for" standard,
according to which the misrepresentation was so material that the
patent should not have issued; (2) the subjective "but for" standard,
according to which the misrepresentation actually caused the
examiner to approve the patent application when he would not
otherwise have done so; (3) the "but it may have" standard, according
to which the misrepresentation may have influenced the patent
examiner in the course of prosecution; (4) the "reasonable examiner"
standard, according to which information is material where there is a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner would consider it
important in deciding whether to allow the application to issue as a
patent; and (5) the Rule 56 standard, according to which information
is material when it is not cumulative to information already of record
or being made of record in the application, and (a) it establishes, by
itself or in combination with other information, a prima facie case of
unpatentability of a claim, or (b) it refutes, or is inconsistent with, a
position the applicant takes in (i) opposing an argument of
unpatentability relied on by the PTO, or (ii) asserting an argument of
patentability.60
The court recently clarified that if a misstatement or omission is
deemed material under at least one of the five tests, it is relevant for
the purpose of determining whether the patentee committed
inequitable conduct.6 1 Of course, if a misstatement or omission is not
deemed material under any of the five tests, it is not relevant in an
inquiry into inequitable conduct.
B. Proper Basis for Reissue
A reissue application may be filed when a patent is "deemed
wholly or partly inoperative or invalid, by reason of a defective
specification or drawing, or by reason of the patentee claiming more
or less than he had a right to claim in the patent."62 The error in
question-and in fact all errors to be corrected in the reissue-must
have arisen without deceptive intent.63
59. Digital Control v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
60. Id. at 1315-16.
61. Id. at 1316.
62. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2006).
63. Id.; 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.175(a)(2), (b)(l)-(2) (2009).
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A thorough review of proper bases for reissue is beyond the
scope of this article. However, for the present purposes it is necessary
to address the question posed by the Clark court: whether it is proper
to seek reissue in order to disclose uncited prior art where no holding
of unenforceability has arisen from the patentee's failure to have
disclosed the art. There are two aspects to this question.
First, there is the question of whether the failure to disclose art
alone can serve as the basis for a reissue application. It is difficult to
imagine how this question could be answered in the affirmative. The
concept of "error" correctable by reissue has been construed
liberally,64 but it has not been understood to encompass mere review
of information without amendment. 65 Furthermore, as noted above,
35 U.S.C. § 251 requires the reissue applicant to assert that a patent is
wholly or partly inoperative or invalid.66 The failure to disclose art
per se cannot render a patent invalid or inoperative.
On this question it is instructive to compare reissue under § 251
with the short-lived "no-defect" reissue, previously available under
37 C.F.R. § 1.1 75(a)(4). This procedure enabled patentees to
have their claims considered in light of new prior art without
amending the claims or specification and without including in the
reissue oath a statement of belief, otherwise required by 35 U.S.C.
§ 251, that the original patent was "wholly or partly inoperative or
invalid". Though the reissue application would be rejected for
failure to comply with § 251, the record of prosecution would
indicate the PTO's evaluation of the prior art and thereby assist a
district court.68
As stated, the no-defect reissue application would be rejected under
§ 251. Consequently, no reissue patent could be granted on a no-
64. See generally R. CARL MOY, MOY'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 16:98 et seq. (4th ed.
2008).
65. See, e.g., In re Dien, 680 F.2d 151, 153 n.4 (C.C.P.A. 1982) ("The purpose of reissue
under 35 USC 251 . . . being to correct a defect in a patent, it goes without saying that reissue of
a patent in identical form with the original patent is not a possibility."); see also 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.177(c) ("No reissue application containing only unamended patent claims and not correcting
an error in the original patent will be passed to issue by itself.") (addressing multiple reissue
applications).
66. See 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2006).
67. A judgment of inequitable conduct notwithstanding, of course, but subsequent reissue
in such a case would be barred by Clark.
68. J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex, Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1558 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(emphasis added); see also In re Fotland, 779 F.2d 31, 32 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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defect reissue application. 6 9 This proceeding was deemed nothing
more than the issuance of an advisory opinion and was conclusively
determined not to be a reissue under 35 U.S.C. § 251,70 and after
several years, the proceeding was eliminated.7 Thus, the mere failure
to disclose art without a concession that the art necessitates an
amendment could serve as the basis for a no-defect reissue, which
would not proceed under § 251. However, such an omission does not
constitute "error" within the meaning of § 251.
Second, there is the question of whether reissue is a proper
mechanism to obtain PTO review of information (a term intended to
be broader than "prior art") not submitted during prosecution if there
is a separate, independent basis for reissue. For example, suppose that
during a post-issuance review the patentee discovers (1) that
reference A, which was known to the patentee 72 during prosecution,
should have been submitted to the PTO but does not necessitate an
amendment; and (2) that reference B, which was not known to the
patentee during prosecution, should be submitted to the PTO and does
necessitate an amendment. If the patentee files a reissue application
amending the claims to avoid reference B, and also citing reference A
merely in compliance with the duty of disclosure,7 3 is it proper for the
PTO to consider reference A? The patentee has satisfied the statutory
requirement of alleging inoperability of the patent through error
without deceptive intention,74  and he is therefore entitled to
examination of the reissue application in the same manner as any non-
provisional application, which includes consideration of all
information properly submitted to the PTO.
69. Dien, 680 F.2d at 155 ("[N]o reissue patent will be granted, at least until the
happening of future events in accordance with 35 USC § 251 which would justify it."); Fotland,
779 F.2d at 34.
70. Dien, 680 F.2d at 154-55; Fotland, 779 F.2d at 34.
71. Dien, 680 F.2d at 155.
72. The patentee is often a corporation or other non-person entity. However, for ease of
exposition when discussing the duty of disclosure, the term "patentee" will be used to
encompass all of the persons contemplated by 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(c), each of whom is a "Rule 56
party."
73. The reissue process restarts the duty of candor. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.63(b)(3), 1.175(a)
(2009).
74. It is assumed that the amendment in question satisfies 35 U.S.C. § 251.
75. 37 C.F.R. § 1.176(a) (2009); U.S. DEP'T OF COM., MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE § 609 (8th ed. 2008) [hereinafter "MPEP"] ("Once the minimum requirements of37
CFR 1.97 and 37 CFR 1.98 are met, the examiner has an obligation to consider the
information.").
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Thus, the second question is answered in the affirmative.
Additionally, as discussed above, the mere submission of information
without amendment being unable to provide a basis for reissue under
§ 251, information that does not necessitate amendment is not
recognized as "error" under the statute. This compels the question
whether the answer to the second question changes-i.e., whether
§ 251 is no longer satisfied-if such information was intentionally
withheld during original prosecution. For example, if the patentee
intentionally failed to disclose a reference during the original
prosecution, and the reference is later (e.g., during trial) determined to
be material to patentability, has the requirement of "without deceptive
intention" been met?
In § 251, the terms "error" and "deceptive intention" each appear
but once, and in their single presentation are inextricably tied to one
another: the "error" must have arisen without deceptive intention.
And, as discussed above, the "error" is the basis for the reissue
application, which does not include the mere citation of information
without amendment or other correction. Basic statutory construction
compels the conclusion that, regardless of the intent behind the
untimely submission, art or other information is properly submitted
even if it does not necessitate amendment or other correction. There is
simply no statutory basis for excluding such subject matter from the
meaning of "error" in determining whether a perceived deficiency is
categorically correctable while including the very same subject matter
as within the statute's requirement that an "error" be without
deceptive intention.n7 ,78
76. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2006) ("Whenever any patent is, through error without any
deceptive intention, deemed wholly or partly inoperative or invalid, by reason of a defective
specification or drawing, or by reason of the patentee claiming more or less than he had a right
to claim in the patent.") (emphasis added).
77. The Federal Circuit has recognized that statutory language controls even when the
result seems contrary to a supposed legislative intent. See, e.g., Stark v. Advanced Magnetics,
Inc., 119 F.3d 1551, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("We read [35 U.S.C.] section 116 as requiring lack
of deceptive intent in both cases of misjoinder and nonjoinder. The basis for this interpretation is
the comma found after the term 'application,' a comma conspicuously absent from section 256.
Thus, our interpretation of section 256 . .. differs from our interpretation of section 116.... At
the same time, the pertinent legislative history suggests that sections 256 and 116 are to be
interpreted in a uniform manner. However, to the extent that the language of sections 116 and
256 lead to different and, arguably, inconsistent results, a situation exists which only Congress
has the power to resolve.") (citations omitted).
78. The interpretation of "error" should be the same for 37 C.F.R. § 1.175. There is no
definition of "error" provided, but the language of section 1.175(a)(1), which tracks the
language of 35 U.S.C. § 251, makes clear that the regulation's purpose is to govern
administration of the statutory section. Thus, the requirement in sections 1.175(a)(2), (b)(1) and
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However, if the art in question necessitates an amendment to
restore the patent's operability or validity, then the focus shifts to
whether the error proposed to be corrected by the amendment is
properly an "error" under the statute. In this situation, the citation of
the art is merely incidental to the basis for reissue except to the
following extent: if the art was intentionally withheld from the PTO
in order to gain allowance, then the error in question could not have
arisen "without any deceptive intention" as required by statute.79 In
this case, whether or not there has been a prior holding of
unenforceability is irrelevant: the error is simply uncorrectable by
80
reissue.
A related question is what effect the reissue proceeding should
have with respect to the judgment regarding the patentee's conduct
during the original prosecution. Again, if the patentee intentionally
failed to disclose a reference during the original prosecution, and the
reference is later determined to be material to patentability, should
submission of the reference during reissue prosecution effectively
cure this omission so as to preclude a judgment of inequitable
conduct? The remainder of Section III addresses this question.
C. Not Considering Materiality
This section primarily addresses omissions rather than
misrepresentations. While the line between the two may not always
be clear, for present purposes an omission can be cured by the mere
provision of the subject matter at issue, while a misrepresentation
cannot. However, the principles outlined for omissions will be useful
for addressing misrepresentations, which is undertaken in
Section III.E.2., below.
1. Materiality of Submitted References
All five standards of materiality (see Section III.A., above) share
the feature of presuming that had the examiner been aware of the
withheld information, she would not have or may not have allowed
the patent to issue with the claims as she did. The objective and
subjective "but for" standards are explicit that the examiner would not
(b)(2) that the reissue applicant declare that all errors corrected or to be corrected arose without
deceptive intention should be satisfied when non-amendment-necessitating art is submitted,
irrespective of the intent behind its original withholding.
79. 35 U.S.C. § 251.
80. See, e.g., In re Harita, 847 F.2d 801 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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have allowed the patent to issue with the particular claims, and the
"but it may have" and "reasonable examiner" standards are explicit or
nearly so that she may not have allowed the patent to issue.8' The
Rule 56 standard fairly presumes that the examiner would have at
least considered the information important in deciding whether to
allow the application to issue as a patent inasmuch as "material"
information under this standard bears directly on establishing a case
of unpatentability or diminishing the applicant's argument regarding
patentability 82, and it defies comprehension how information bearing
on patentability could not be considered important. In this respect, the
Rule 56 standard is subsumed within the "reasonable examiner"
standard.
Notably, in assessing materiality under each of the articulated
standards, one must presume what the effect of withholding the
information might have been on the examiner because the assessor is
not in a position of knowing the effect, the examiner not having had
the information to consider. Thus, it may be that a particular examiner
would not have considered some withheld reference 83 to be material,
but a court later holds that the hypothetical "reasonable examiner"
would have considered it material. In such a case, by having withheld
the reference the applicant forgoes the benefit of having had the
examiner consider it without requiring a concession by the applicant:
the benefit being that no charge of inequitable conduct could have
been brought based on the applicant's failure to submit the reference.
In the alternative case, where the applicant does submit the
reference, there is no need for a presumption regarding its effect on
the examiner: the court need simply examine the prosecution history.
The examiner might acknowledge the reference without comment, or
she might issue a rejection in view of it. Either way, the court will not
make an inquiry into whether or not the examiner properly evaluated
the import of the reference.84
81. See Digital Control v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1315-16 (Fed. Cir.
2006).
82. Id.
83. For ease of exposition, "reference" is meant to include any information, and not only
documents.
84. The court will not make such an inquiry with respect to inequitable conduct. Of
course, the court may decide that the examiner was wrong and that the reference renders the
patent invalid (and see note 85, infra). It is important to keep in mind that the duty imposed on
the applicant is one of providing information to the examiner, not one of ensuring that the
examiner acts on the information as a court later determines she should have. For example,
suppose the applicant does submit a reference, the examiner considers it but does not issue a
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It is thereby seen that the court does not inquire into the
materiality of a reference submitted to the PTO during prosecution.
Whether or not a submitted reference ultimately affects the validity of
an issued patentss is a question examined when the issue is invalidity.
In such a case, the court examines the effect of the reference with
respect to the various criteria required for patent entitlement found in
the statute;86 the question of "materiality" simply is not raised. Thus,
there is a dichotomy of inquiry into an examiner's assessment of a
reference. For a withheld reference, the court looks into its supposed
effect on a hypothetical "reasonable examiner." 87 For a submitted
reference, the court presumes that by allowing the patent to issue the
examiner has concluded that the reference does not render the claims
unpatentable irrespective of its "materiality," but that conclusion is
not unassailable.88
Thus, submission of a reference during prosecution precludes the
inquiry into materiality that would be undertaken if the reference had
not been submitted. This article's critical assertion is that this
preclusion is no less warranted for a reference submitted during
reissue prosecution, even when the reference was withheld during
original prosecution. This assertion is perhaps uncontroversial where
the reference was unknown to the patentee during original
prosecution. However, if we are to examine the ability of a patentee to
prospectively cure what would later be judged inequitable conduct, it
must be assumed that the reference was known to and withheld by the
patentee prior to the original issuance. The crucial question then is
rejection or otherwise require a concession by the applicant in view of it, and the patent issues.
Later, when the applicant-turned-patentee asserts the patent against an alleged infringer, a court,
considering the accused infringer's defense of invalidity based on the same reference, holds that
the reference does, indeed, render the patent invalid. In this case, the examiner's error is not
attributed to the patentee's failure to explain how the submitted reference invalidated the patent.
More likely is that the patentee agreed with the examiner's assessment of the reference; but in
any event the patentee is not penalized for the PTO's having issued him an invalid patent.
85. Validity is assessed on a claim-by-claim basis, but for ease of exposition the
invalidity of a "patent" is intended to refer to the invalidity of the particular claims at issue.
86. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103, 112 (2006).
87. See, e.g., Digital Control v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1314 (Fed. Cir.
2006).
88. That fact notwithstanding, an examiner's decision to issue the patent is not to be
taken lightly. Examiners are presumed to do their jobs correctly, and "[dieference is due the
[PTO's] decision to issue the patent with respect to evidence bearing on validity which it
considered." Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, 725 F.2d 1350, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir.
1984). Moreover, an issued patent carries a presumption of validity. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006).
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whether the assertion is justified when the patentee intentionally
withholds the reference.
2. The Federal Circuit's Apparent View
Several opinions handed down before Aventis illustrate the
Federal Circuit's thinking regarding the ability of a patentee to cure
conduct prior to judgment. However, as in Aventis, the court in each
case interpreted the cited precedent in an illegitimately broad manner.
Thus, the pronouncements in each of these opinions should be
understood merely as the court's apparent view, the court not yet
having taken the opportunity to address the issue correctly.
a. Bristol-Myers
In Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., the
Federal Circuit considered whether the district court abused its
discretion in holding that Rhone-Poulenc Rorer ("RPR") had obtained
U.S. Patent Nos. 4,924,011 ("the '011 patent") and Re34,277 ("the
Re'277 patent," a reissue of the '011 patent) by inequitable conduct,
and, therefore, that the Re'277 patent was unenforceable. 8 9 Bristol-
Myers Squibb ("BMS") brought a declaratory judgment action against
RPR alleging, inter alia, that the Re'277 patent was unenforceable. 90
The allegation of inequitable conduct was based on the failure to
disclose a reference referred to as "the JACS article" during
prosecution of the '011 patent.9 ' The district court found that the
JACS article was material,92 and that both the '011 and the Re'277
patents had been obtained by inequitable conduct9 3 in that one of the
agents involved in the prosecution of the '011 patent intentionally
withheld the JACS article from the PTO with the intent to mislead the
examiner. 94 The Federal Circuit upheld both the finding of materiality
89. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 326 F.3d 1226, 1229
(Fed. Cir. 2003).
90. Id. at 1233.
91. Id.
92. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., No. 95-CV-8833-RPP, 2001
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15618, at *19-20 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2001).
93. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., No. 95-CV-8833-RPP, 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 480, at *59 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2002). It is puzzling that the '011 patent was
before the court. The grant of a reissue patent effects surrender of the original patent. 35 U.S.C.
§ 252. Therefore, upon reissue the original patent is no longer a legally cognizable instrument.
94. Id. at *53.
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of the JACS article and the finding of deceptive intent in connection
with the withholding of the JACS article. 95
In the previous section it was asserted that (1) submission of a
reference during prosecution precludes the inquiry into materiality
that would be undertaken if the reference had not been submitted; and
(2) this preclusion is no less warranted for a reference submitted
during reissue prosecution, even when the reference was withheld
during original prosecution. In Bristol-Myers, the Federal Circuit
explicitly declined to adopt this conclusion. Specifically, the court
asserted that "although the examiner's allowance of the reissue patent
after considering the JACS article is probative evidence, that does not
end the materiality inquiry."96 However, just as in Aventis, the cited
precedent does not support the assertion.
The assertion together with the language that follows is
reproduced below:
[A]lthough the examiner's allowance of the reissue patent after
considering the JACS article is probative evidence, that does not
end the materiality inquiry. Molins, 48 F. 3d at 1179, 33 USPQ2d
at 1827 (stating that "the result of a PTO proceeding that assesses
patentability in light of infonnation not originally disclosed can be
of strong probative value in determining whether the undisclosed
information was material"). This court has articulated the
materiality criterion as follows:
[T]he standard to be applied in determining whether a
reference is "material" is not whether the particular examiner
of the application at issue considered the reference to be
important; rather, it is that of a "reasonable examiner." Nor is
a reference immaterial simply because the claims are
eventually deemed by an examiner to be patentable thereover.
Id., 33 USPQ2d at 1828 (citation omitted); PerSeptive Biosystems,
Inc. v. Pharmacia Biotech, Inc., 225 F.3d 1315, 1322, 56 USPQ2d
1001, 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (stating that a patent may be valid and
yet be rendered unenforceable due to inequitable conduct). Indeed,
in Molins, the court affirmed a finding of inequitable conduct,
notwithstanding that the withheld reference was later cited in a
reexamination and the claims were allowed to issue.
95. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 326 F.3d 1226, 1234, 1240
(Fed. Cir. 2003).
96. Id. at 1237.
97. Id.
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Eerily similar to Aventis, it was the omission of the underlying
citation by the Molins court that lead to a misreading of the precedent
by the Bristol-Myers court.
The case cited in Molins but not reproduced in Bristol-Myers is
Merck & Co. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., in which the patentee
appealed the judgment of inequitable conduct for having withheld
references, arguing both that the references were merely cumulative
over the art of record and that the finding of materiality was
inconsistent with the holding that the claims were not rendered
obvious by the very same references.98 Explaining that materiality
was not judged under a "but for" standard, the court made the
following statement:
That the claimed invention may have been superior in one property
to both the cited and withheld prior art may be a basis for
patentability; it cannot serve automatically to render the withheld
prior art either cumulative or immaterial.9
There is no dispute that withheld art need not have required a
concession by the applicant in order to be considered material. The
key difference between the Merck court's statement and the Molins
court's restatement is the phrase "by an examiner."100 In Merck, the
references at issue were never before the examiner, and there was no
post-grant proceeding during which submission to the PTO was
attempted.1 0' Rather, the district court determined the patentability of
the claimed invention over the references at issue. Thus, the Molins
court's substitution of "deemed by an examiner to be patentable" for
"be a basis for patentability" obliterates the distinction between
patentability per se and patentability per examiner review. Examiner
review, while not dispositive regarding patentability per se, forecloses
the inquiry into materiality of the reviewed reference. This distinction
was ignored in both Bristol-Myers and Molins.
In contrast to the situation in Merck, in Bristol-Myers the JACS
article had actually been before the examiner, albeit during reissue,
and the examiner did not issue a rejection over it.102 The court
98. Merck & Co. v. Danbury Pharm., Inc., 873 F.2d 1418, 1420-21 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
99. Id. at 1421.
100. Merck, 873 F.2d at 1421; Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1177 (Fed. Cir.
1995).
101. Merck, 873 F.2d 1418.
102. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 326 F.3d 1226, 1236-37
(Fed. Cir. 2003).
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mistakenly pronounced that the examiner's allowance "does not end
the materiality inquiry"'10 3 because it conflated the two patentability
determinations described in the preceding paragraph. This conflation
arose directly from the court's reliance on Molins.104
b. Molins
In Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., the Federal Circuit considered
the enforceability of the Molins U.S. Patent No. 4,369,563 ("the '563
patent") in the context of reexamination.10 5 Defendant Textron alleged
the '563 patent to be unenforceable for inequitable conduct based on
the failure to disclose several articles collectively referred to as
"Wagenseil."l 06 Although aware of Wagenseil during prosecution, the
prosecuting attorney for Molins did not submit it to the PTO.10 7
However, after issuance of the '563 patent, a different attorney, then
in charge of the patent for Molins, filed a prior art statement under
37 C.F.R. § 1.501 listing Wagenseil among other references. 08
Shortly thereafter, reexamination of the '563 patent was initiated
by a third party on the basis of art including Wagenseil.109 During
reexamination, Molins referred the examiner to the Rule 501 citation
of art, but the examiner indicated that the art was not of record and
would not be until Molins submitted English-language translations of
the foreign-language references."o Molins did so, and the examiner
subsequently initialed each reference indicating consideration
thereof."' No claims were rejected over Wagenseil during
reexamination."12
At trial, the district court held the '563 patent unenforceable for
inequitable conduct for withholding Wagenseil and other information
103. Id. at 1237.
104. Id. As shown in the quoted text, the court also cited PerSeptive Biosystems, Inc. v.
Pharmacia Biotech, Inc., 225 F.3d 1315, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000) for the proposition that "a patent
may be valid and yet be rendered unenforceable due to inequitable conduct." Issue is not taken
with this reading of the case, but it is clear that just as in Merck the PerSeptive Biosystems court
was addressing the issue of patentability per se. See id. at 1322 ("[W]hether concealed prior art
would actually invalidate the patent is irrelevant to materiality.") (emphasis added).
105. See Molins, 48 F.3d 1172.
106. Id. at 1176 n.4, 1177.
107. Id. at 1176-77.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1177.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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from the PTO during prosecution." 3 During the time that the
application that issued as the '563 patent was pending, the
prosecuting attorney had represented to foreign patent offices that
Wagenseil was the closest prior art.1 14 The court rejected Molins's
argument that the attorney had acted in good faith because while he
had focused on Wagenseil several times during more than ten years of
foreign prosecution, he had never cited it to the PTO during thirteen
years of US prosecution."'
The Federal Circuit concluded that the district court neither
made clear errors of fact nor abused its discretion in holding that the
failure to disclose Wagenseil amounted to inequitable conduct.1 6
Regarding the post-issuance submission of Wagenseil, the court
stated only this:
We recognize that Wagenseil and other references from the foreign
prosecution were cited eventually to the PTO and that the examiner
initialed them and passed the reexamination application to issue
thereafter. However, the references were not cited when they
should have been." 7
Similar to the situation in Bristol-Myers, in Molins the patentee did
not cite Wagenseil during prosecution, but the reference was before
the examiner during reexamination."' 8 During reexamination, no
rejection was issued over Wagenseil, and it was undisputed that the
examiner had in fact reviewed it.l19 However, the court held the
absence of rejection to be "not conclusive" on the question of
Wagenseil's materiality.120
The Molins court's erroneous restatement of Merck has already
been discussed, but the court did not rely on Merck alone. A.B. Dick
Co. v. Burroughs Corp. ,121 cited for the proposition "that the claims
may be patentable over the withheld prior art is not the test for
materiality""' contributes no more to resolving the issue than does
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1181.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1182.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1177.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1180.
121. A.B. Dick Co. v. Burroughs Corp.,798 F.2d 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
122. Molins, 48 F.3d at 1179-80.
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Merck.12 3 Western Electric Co. v. Piezo Tech., Inc.,124 cited for the
proposition that "the standard to be applied in determining whether a
reference is 'material' is not whether the particular examiner of the
application at issue considered the reference to be important; rather it
is that of a 'reasonable examiner,"'l 2 5 is no more helpful when the
allegation of inequitable conduct is premised on a mere omission
rather than a misrepresentation.2 6
The most persuasive statement in Molins, at least on its face, is
the following:
We have held that the result of a PTO proceeding that assesses
patentability in light of information not originally disclosed can be
of strong probative value in determining whether the undisclosed
information was material. See J.P. Stevens (reasonable rejection of
claims in reliance on a reference during reissue proceeding
established materiality of that reference).127
JP. Stevens did concern evaluation of a reference's materiality
following a "reissue proceeding," but the question under
consideration here was not addressed by the court.128 Among the
defendants' assertions raised against the charge of infringement were
invalidity as anticipated and/or obvious, and "fraud on the PTO" for
the knowing failure to disclose various references during
123. As with PerSeptive Biosystems, no issue is taken with the statement regarding
materiality, but it is inapposite inasmuch as it addresses only patentability per se. To the extent
the case holding goes beyond that, which it surely does, it is no longer viable precedent: "The
precise issue is whether nondisclosure by an applicant during prosecution can be considered
inequitable conduct ... where the nondisclosure was of known prior art references on which the
examiner (after independently discovering the references) rejected claims previously allowed."
A.B. Dick, 798 F.2d at 1396; cf 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) ("The duty [of disclosure] is deemed to be
satisfied if all information known to be material to patentability . . . was cited by the Office or
submitted to the Office in the manner prescribed."); In re Oxycontin Antitrust Litig., 530 F.
Supp.2d 554, 573 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) ("Defendants' reliance on [A.B. Dick] for the proposition
that inequitable conduct can be predicated on the non-disclosure of a document cited by the PTO
is misplaced, as that case was decided prior to the promulgation in 1992 of the relevant
regulations."); accord Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565,
1582 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("When a reference was before the examiner, whether through the
examiner's search or the applicant's disclosure, it can not be deemed to have been withheld
from the examiner.").
124. 860 F.2d 428, 433 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
125. Molins, 48 F.3d at 1179.
126. See infra Part III.F.2.b.
127. Molins, 48 F.3d at 1179 (citing J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex, Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553,
1562 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
128. Id.
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prosecution.12 9 After trial on other issues but before trial on validity,
the district court ordered the patentee to file a reissue application.130
Most of the claims were rejected by the reissue examiner over one or
both of Weiss or DaGasso, two of the references on whose
withholding the fraud allegation was based.' 3 ' The district court
thereafter found the references not material. With this finding the
Federal Circuit found error, leading to the foregoing quotation,
asserting that the district court "essentially ignor[ed] the PTO reissue
proceeding."' 32
However, the applicability of this holding is quite limited. The
"reissue proceeding" referred to is not the statutory reissue under
consideration in this article but rather the "no-defect" reissue
discussed in Section III.B., above. 33 The significance of this is that
the no-defect reissue was nothing more than a PTO proceeding to
assess patentability, an advisory opinion; and a patent having
undergone such a "reissue" did not obtain the benefit as a patent
emerging from a reexamination 3 4 or a "true" reissue.13 Therefore, it
was error for both the Molins court and the Bristol-Myers court
relying on Molins to apply the language of J.P. Stevens regarding the
"result of a PTO proceeding that assesses patentability" 36 to the
reexamination and reissue proceedings, respectively, before them.
Each court affirmed the respective district court's finding of
materiality as a consequence of not assigning appropriate weight to
the result of these proceedings.137
c. American Hoist
American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons'38 provides no
further insight. There, American Hoist sued Sowa for patent
infringement, and Sowa asserted invalidity.13 9 Sowa later brought to
129. JP. Stevens, 747 F.2d at 1557.
130. Id. at 1558.
131. Id. at 1559.
132. Id. at 1562.
133. Id. at 1558 & n.2.
134. See 35 U.S.C. § 307 (2006).
135. See 35 U.S.C. § 252.
136. JP. Stevens, 747 F.2d at 1562.
137. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 326 F.3d 1226, 1237 (Fed.
Cir. 2003); Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1182 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
138. Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, 725 F.2d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
139. Id. at 1354.
2010] PROSPECTIVELY CURING INEQUITABLE CONDUCT 377
American Hoist's attention what it deemed new prior art, and
American Hoist subsequently filed an application for "reissue" of its
patent.140 Sowa then amended its answer to include an allegation that
American Hoist had committed "fraud in the PTO" by not disclosing
to the examiner the prior art that Sowa had discovered.14 1 The jury
returned a verdict that each claim of the original patent was invalid as
obvious and for "fraud on the Patent Office."'142 Shortly after the
verdict, the PTO allowed the claims in "reissue," two of the three
sued upon without amendment.14 3 In considering the effect of the
proceeding on the verdict, the district court found that the allowance
"makes [it] a harder case, but does not remove the finding of fraud by
the jury."l 44
On appeal, American Hoist asserted that the district court erred
in instructing the jury, including "in refusing to instruct the jury on
the effect of the reissue proceedings on the quantum of proof
necessary for Sowa to prove obviousness."l 4 5 Reversing the
judgments of obviousness and "fraud" and remanding to the district
court, the Federal Circuit stated (albeit in dictum):
Should the case be tried again to a jury, however, it is clearly
appropriate that the jury be instructed that because the PTO [in
"reissue"] held the claims in suit patentable in light of the
additional art discovered by Sowa, its burden of proof of
unpatentability has become more difficult to sustain-a fact
likewise to be taken into account by the trial judge. With respect to
the "fraud" issue, it is also manifest that the decision of the PTO
may have an effect on determining the degree of materiality of the
involved prior art ... .146
Not discussed at any length in the opinion, however, is the crucial fact
that the "reissue" referred to was not a "true" reissue under § 251 but
rather a "no-defect" reissue.14 7 As no-defect reissues do not obtain the
benefit of true reissues, the Federal Circuit's instruction on
reconsideration of materiality rather than non-consideration of
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1355.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1364 (emphasis added).
147. Id. at 1364 n.6.
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materiality was entirely appropriate.14 8 In contrast, invocation of this
case in support of statements regarding the effect of § 251 reissue on
inequitable conduct is not appropriate.
D. Beyond Materiality
1. Intent vs. Deceptive Intent
It is essential to remember that intent is not necessarily deceptive
intent. Inequitable conduct requires that the patentee withhold the
reference with deceptive intent, but there is no penalty for
intentionally withholding a reference with a plausible, good-faith
belief that it is not material. 14 9 However, intent of any sort is
notoriously difficult to discern.
The contention that submission of a reference during reissue
precludes inquiry into its materiality may raise the hackles of some,
alarmed at the suggestion that one could withhold information from
the PTO with deceptive intent and obtain a patent, yet be permitted to
atone for his prosecutorial sins through reissue. However, this alarm
is not warranted when one considers how findings of deceptive intent
arise. It is a rare instance in which direct evidence of deceptive intent
is available. Instead, intent is typically inferred from circumstances,
and deceptive intent is often inferred when the materiality of a
reference is sufficiently high.5 o Heralding the return of the
inequitable conduct "plague,"' 5' at times materiality alone appears to
satisfy the court that the patentee acted in bad faith.152 The cart is
148. Additionally, there is an equitable justification for the court's approach. See infra
Part III.G.
149. See, e.g., Dayco Prods. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
150. See Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., 437 F.3d 1181, 1191 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
151. See Erik R. Puknys & Jared D. Schuettenhelm, Application of the Inequitable
Conduct Doctrine After Kingsdown, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 839, 840-
41 & n.15 (2009).
152. See, e.g., Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 525 F.3d 1334, 1350 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) (Rader, J. dissenting), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2053 (2009) ("[Tlhe judicial process
has too often emphasized materiality almost to the exclusion of any analysis of the lofty intent
requirement for inequitable conduct. Merging intent and materiality at levels far below the
Kingsdown rule has revived the inequitable conduct tactic."); Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc.,
437 F.3d 1181, 1196-97 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Newman, J., dissenting) ("The panel majority, steeped
in adverse inferences, holds that good faith is irrelevant and presumes bad faith. Thus the court
resurrects the plague of the past, ignoring the Kingsdown requirements of clear and convincing
evidence of a misrepresentation or omission material to patentability, made intentionally and for
the purpose of deception.").
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thereby put before the horse: the alarm is due to the (inferred)
deceptive intent, but without a determination of materiality there is no
inference of deceptive intent. Without such an inference, in the
absence of direct evidence there is no reason to believe the intent was
deceptive, and therefore no cause for alarm.
A patentee's actions, including the intentional withholding of a
reference, should not be presumed deceptive without good reason.'5
Without direct evidence of deception, there is only inference; and
without a determination of materiality, there is no inference. Should
the patentee be permitted to escape evaluation of materiality simply
by submitting the reference? This is precisely the rule of law for
original prosecution, and reissue prosecution is governed in pertinent
part by the same rules.154 The question of whether policy counsels a
different result is addressed next.
2. The Public Interest: Deterrence and Discouraging
Behavior
Consider the argument that the assertion (that submission during
reissue forecloses the materiality inquiry) is not warranted inasmuch
as the patentee has benefited from having his patent issue without the
PTO having had the opportunity to review the previously withheld
reference, and he should not be permitted to gain advantage by his
purposeful omission. In the situation under consideration, the
withheld reference does not necessitate a claim amendment.' Thus,
the reissued claims are identical to the claims of the original patent
insofar as the effect of the reference is concerned (the claims will
likely have been broadened or narrowed on account of the asserted
"error"). Therefore, the only possible benefit of the original grant will
have been one of deterrence, i.e., a party abstaining from infringing
activity believing that the patent was enforceable.
153. See N. Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ("Intent
to deceive should be determined in light of the realities of patent practice, and not as a matter of
strict liability whatever the nature of the action before the PTO. A patentee's oversights are
easily magnified out of proportion by one accused of infringement. Given the ease with which a
relatively routine act of patent prosecution can be portrayed as intended to mislead or deceive,
clear and convincing evidence of conduct sufficient to support an inference of culpable intent is
required.") (citations omitted).
154. See 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2006); 37 C.F.R. § 1.176(a) (2009).
155. When a claim amendment is required, the inquiry into intent in withholding the
reference conflates with the inquiry into intent in amending, i.e., intent in correcting an "error."
In that case a full examination of intent is required inasmuch as the propriety of the reissue
proceeding is implicated. See supra Part III.B.
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This type of deterrence is part and parcel of the patent system.
Patents whose claims are subsequently narrowed during reissue or
reexamination potentially have deterred parties from acting within the
space between the original and the amended claims.156 The same is
undoubtedly true of patents whose relevant claims are held invalid
over prior art following trial. In the latter case, a would-be defendant
in possession of the prior art may even believe with absolute certainty
in the invalidity of the claims and yet forego facially infringing
activity due to the high cost of proving invalidity through litigation.
The difference between these cases and the case under consideration,
the argument continues, is that in the former the patentee is the
unwitting beneficiary of deterrence, while in the latter the benefit is
the result of his purposeful inaction.
However, this argument is not convincing inasmuch as it
presumes that the intent in withholding the reference is the same as
the intent to obtain the benefit. As discussed above, intentionally
withholding a reference with a plausible, good-faith belief in its
immateriality is not deceptive intent. A patentee who so withholds a
reference is no more guilty of attempting to dishonestly obtain the
deterrent benefit than one who in good faith convinces the PTO that a
particular reference does not invalidate his patent, only to have a court
determine that it does.
Furthermore, it is in the public's interest to encourage post-grant
proceedings such as reissue. Examination of the European post-grant
opposition system reveals substantial economic benefit in the form of
reduced litigation, owing to the inability to assert patents that would
be found invalid or otherwise unenforceable following trial.' At the
same time, the patentee incurs a substantial risk by initiating post-
grant review proceedings, namely, the possibility that all meaningful
claims will be canceled.'58 Considering that intentional omissions are
not necessarily deceptive, and weighed against the benefit gained by
the public from post-grant proceedings and the inherent risk borne by
156. See, e.g., Principle Business Enterprises, Inc. v. U.S., 226 U.S.P.Q. 180, 184 (1985).
157. See, e.g., Bronwyn H. Hall & Dietmar Harhoff, Post-Grant Reviews in the U.S.
Patent System - Design Choices and Expected Impact, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 989, 1002-08.
(2004).
158. The same risk is incurred upon initiating litigation to enforce the patent, but in that
case the patent carries a presumption of validity, and any challenger must prove invalidity by
clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., Technology Licensing Corp. v. Videotek, Inc., 545
F.3d 1316, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2008). There is no presumption of validity during reissue. See, e.g.,
In re Doyle, 482 F.2d 1385, 1392 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
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the patentee in undertaking them, the deterrent benefit argument is far
from convincing.15 9
Consider the situation in which one Rule 56 party is aware of a
reference but does not appreciate its materiality, and so
intentionally-but not deceptivelyl 60-fdoes not submit it to the PTO.
The reference is later deemed material by a different Rule 56 party
who was unaware of the reference until after grant. After a pre-
litigation review, 16 1 the patentee decides to apply for reissue in order
to correct an unrelated error. The duty of candor is reinstated, and the
patentee is now faced with a choice. If he decides not to submit the
reference, even believing it material to patentability, he has satisfied
the elements of inequitable conduct. 162 If instead he complies with the
duty of candor and submits the reference, he has only harmed himself.
As the law was applied in Aventis, the submission of the reference has
no bearing on the determination of inequitable conduct for having
withheld the reference during prosecution of the original application,
even if the PTO grants the reissue patent with no amendment required
on account of the reference. In the Aventis Court's view, the damage
has been done and cannot be undone.163 Furthermore, by his
submission the patentee has brought the reference to the attention of
all parties who would seek a judgment of unenforceability, a group
that presumably includes each and every party sued for infringement.
Faced with these options, the patentee might well decide to withhold
the reference with the hope that it is never discovered. This is then the
patentee's only alternative to outfitting the reference with a bullseye
for his adversaries, and is precisely the sort of behavior the law
should discourage.
159. The argument may be more convincing depending on the timing of various events.
See supra Part III.F.
160. Although, admittedly some panels of the Federal Circuit believe that it is sufficient
that the party should have known of the materiality of the information. See Puknys, supra note
151, at 858-62.
161. For example, two years after FDA approval of a successful drug product for which
the patent in question is listed in the Orange Book and therefore certain to be the subject of
litigation under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) in another two years.
162. Recall that "[o]nce threshold findings of materiality and intent are established, the
trial court must weigh them to determine whether the equities warrant a conclusion that
inequitable conduct occurred." Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharm., 438 F.3d 1123, 1128 (Fed.
Cir. 2006). Thus, it would be improper to say at this point that the patentee has committed
inequitable conduct.
163. Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 525 F.3d 1334, 1341 n.6 (Fed. Cir.
2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2053 (2009).
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The present assertion is that submission of a reference during
reissue obviates evaluation of the reference's materiality. The lack of
a finding of materiality precludes not only the inference of deceptive
intent but the entire inquiry, materiality itself being an element of
inequitable conduct. To hold otherwise, to preclude the post-grant
patentee from having his reference considered in the same manner as
that of the pre-grant applicant, conflates intent generally with
deceptive intent. Such a holding is neither fair to the patentee, who is
under the same duty of candor as the patent applicant, nor in the
public interest, which encourages post-grant review. It was first
demonstrated that precedent does not necessitate a different result. It
is now demonstrated that no viable policy argument exists in
opposition to it, and that the public interest is served by adopting it.
E. Curing Original Omissions and Misrepresentations During
Reissue
1. The PTO's View
While recognizing that the PTO has no jurisdiction over an
issued patent64 (interference with a pending application
notwithstanding), it is nonetheless instructive to understand the
agency's view inasmuch as it may be persuasive to a court. Moreover,
as discussed below, the PTO will not issue a patent to an applicant
believed to have engaged in fraudulent behavior during prosecution.
Therefore, the PTO's position is important to understand at least
insofar as it limits the options available to a patentee looking to cure
past conduct through reissue.
The Manual of Patent Examining Procedure ("MPEP"), which
governs the PTO examiners and the examination process in general,
recites, in pertinent part:
It is clear that "fraud" cannot be purged through the reissue
process. See conclusions of Law 89 and 91 in Intermountain
Research and Eng'g Co. v. Hercules Inc.
Clearly, "fraud" practiced or attempted in an application which
issues as a patent is "fraud" practiced or attempted in connection
with any subsequent application to reissue that patent. The reissue
application and the patent are inseparable as far as questions of
164. In re Dien, 680 F.2d 151, 154 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (citing McCormick Harvesting
Machine Co. v. Aultman, 169 U.S. 606 (1898)).
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"fraud," "inequitable conduct," or "violation of the duty of
disclosure" are concerned. See In re Heany, supra; and Norton v.
Curtiss, wherein the court stated:
We take this to indicate that any conduct which will prevent the
enforcement of a patent after the patent issues should, if discovered
earlier, prevent the issuance of the patent.165
However, in yet another variation on a recurring theme, careful
examination of each of the cited sources reveals that these cases do
not support the breadth of the PTO's pronouncements.
a. Intermountain Research
Intermountain Research & Eng'g Co. v. Hercules, Inc.
concerned an action based in part on the defendant's alleged
infringement of U.S. Patent No. Re 25,695 ("the Re'695 patent"). 66
Among the defenses raised by the defendants was the allegation that
the Re'695 patent was unenforceable because "fraud was committed
on the Patent Office by the filing of a deliberately misleading and
incomplete oath with the application for it, and by the deliberate
withholding from and misrepresentations to the Patent Office during
the prosecution of the '036 and [Re]'695 patents of relevant
information relating to prior art and to prior knowledge."' 6 ' The
defendants eventually prevailed on this defense. 6 s
Well after initiation of the action, but prior to the start of trial,
the patentee filed an application to reissue the Re'695 patent in order
to obtain additional claims.16 9 Following judgment that the Re'695
patent was invalid and unenforceable against them, the defendants
filed a supplemental counterclaim for declaratory judgment that no
reissue of the Re'695 patent could be enforced against them.170
Regarding the claims sought to be added in the reissue, the defendants
asserted that "said claims, if issued, would be unenforceable against
them for the same reasons that [the initially asserted claims] of the
165. MPEP, supra note 75 (citations omitted).
166. See Intermountain Research & Eng'g Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 171 U.S.P.Q. 577 (C.D.
Cal. 1971).
167. Id. at 579. The quoted language is from the court's findings of fact, not the
defendant's pleading.
168. Id. at 625.
169. Id. The claims are described by the patentee as being of intermediate scope.
170. Id.
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[Re]'695 patent are unenforceable against them."' 7' In finding for the
defendants, the court similarly stated:
No valid patent can issue on the application filed to reissue the
[Re]'695 patent. No such patent, if issued, is enforceable against
the defendants here for the same reasons that the [Re]'695 patent is
unenforceable against them.172
This is Conclusion of Law 91, cited by the PTO as supporting the
assertion that "[ilt is clear that 'fraud' cannot be purged through the
reissue process." 73 There are two reasons why this statement does not
fulfill the purpose for which it was invoked.
First, the court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the
motion.' 74 Without digressing into a discussion of Article III's
prohibition on advisory opinions, it should be clear that an advisory
opinion is precisely what the defendants requested and what the court
issued. Defendants argued that "said claims, if issued, would be
unenforceable." 7 5 Similarly, the court stated that "[n]o such patent, if
issued, is enforceable."' 76  These are subjunctive propositions
concerning a pending application. Propriety of a pending application
is the sole province of the PTO.177 Even if it were not, Article III
would prevent the court's "holding" from having any legitimacy.
Second, even as dictum the court's statement does not support
the PTO's broad proposition. Although the district court did not
explicitly state that its opinion was limited to the particular facts, its
opinion was in force of reasoning limited to the facts concerning the
reissue of the Re'695 patent. The court's discussion of the legitimacy
of the imagined reissue patent is a factual recitation of its deficiencies,
specifically, deficiencies already noted as present in the Re'695
patent.17 8  Additionally, absent from the PTO's citation to
Intermountain Research is Conclusion of Law 90, which recites:
171. Id.
172. Id. at 632 (citations omitted).
173. MPEP, supra note 75 (citing Intermountain Research & Eng'g Co. v. Hercules, Inc.,
171 U.S.P.Q. 577, 631-32 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
174. Notably brief is Conclusion of Law 1, entitled "Jurisdiction," which states in its
entirety, "This Court has jurisdiction of the parties and the issues herein." Intermountain
Research & Eng'g Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 171 U.S.P.Q. 577, 626 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
175. Id. at 625.
176. Id. at 632.
177. See 35 U.S.C. § 2 (2009).
178. See Intermountain Research at 625-26. Finding of Fact 30.04 is particularly telling. It
reads, "There is no disclosure in the application or oath as filed of the work done at duPont in
1943 . . . of the Navy work done at the University of Utah in 1953-54 . . . of the
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The deliberate misjoinder of Farnam as a co-inventor of the '036
patent and of the [Re]'695 patent, being not without deceptive
intention, makes null and void any reissue patent granted in respect
of the [Re]'695 patent. 35 U.S.C. § 116. This deliberate misjoinder
was not cured by the application to the Patent Office to reissue the
[Re]'695 patent to Cook and Farnam as joint inventors ... .179
Despite the absolute implications of the first sentence, the italicized
sentence is notable in that it does not assert that the misjoinder is not
curable, but rather states that it was not cured. In any event, a full
reading of the opinion clarifies the boundaries of the court's
pronouncement: no patent granted on application to reissue the
Re'695 patent would be enforceable against the defendants for the
same reasons that the Re'695 patent is unenforceable against them
because the reissue application shares the deficiencies that render the
Re'695 patent unenforceable. This hardly stands as a general
proposition regarding the purging of fraud through reissue let alone a
"clear" one.
Thus, Intermountain Research does not support the PTO's
sweeping statement that "'fraud' cannot be purged through the reissue
process." 180 In fairness, the PTO cited not Intermountain Research
itself but rather its Conclusions of Law 91 and 89. However,
understood in the context of the Intermountain Research opinion,
these Conclusions and the cases cited therein either simply do not
support the PTO's statement or do not support the PTO's reliance on
them.'81
b. Norton v. Curtiss
The second source of the PTO's position on reissue and fraud,
Norton v. Curtiss concerned the priority decision in an interference
between two applications.182 Norton asserted that Curtiss committed
fraud on the PTO during prosecution of his application, and that
misrepresentations made during the prosecution of the [Re]'695 patent application in respect of
the prior art patent to Streng ... of the defects of the reissue oath in the [Re]'695 patent ... or of
the willful misjoinder of Farnam as a co-inventor, nor is any of the foregoing advanced as a
ground for reissue." Id. at 625 (citations omitted). Similarly, regarding the reissue oath, the
opinion states that "[iln this oath, Cook and Farnam 'reaffirm the averments made in the petition
and oath filed in the application for Re. '695 patent'. The defects of the latter oath are set out
above." Id. at 625 n.15 (citation to the record omitted).
179. Id. at 631-32 (emphasis added).
180. MPEP, supra note 75.
181. See infra Part V for the Appendix which addresses the Conclusions and cited cases.
182. Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
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therefore the Curtiss application should be stricken under Patent
Office Rule 56183 and priority should be awarded to Norton.' 8 4 Norton
had earlier filed a petition asking the Commissioner of Patents to
strike the application based on Curtiss's allegedly fraudulent
misrepresentations," 5 and the petition had been denied.'86 With some
uncertainty regarding its responsibility in the matter, the Board of
Patent Interferences had affirmed,'87 and the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals undertook review.
The court was unequivocal regarding the narrow scope of their
review: "Regarding the question of Norton's fraud charges, the only
issue we have power to decide is whether the Commissioner abused
his authority in holding that the conduct of Curtiss did not warrant
striking his application under Patent Office Rule 56.""' Thus, the
court was not tasked with judging the enforceability of a reissue
patent in which there were allegations of fraud during prosecution of
the original patent. Rather, the court was passing upon the legitimacy
of an administrative action.18 9
After acknowledging the Commissioner's authority to strike an
application under Rule 56 for fraudulent conduct, the court undertook
to determine the standards applicable in making a finding of
"fraud." 90 The language that precedes the lone sentence isolated by
the PTO, above, is reproduced together with this sentence in order to
provide the context for which the PTO's citation begs.
Heretofore, it appears that the action of the Commissioner in
striking an application has always been preceded by the finding of
a court that a fraud had been committed. Nevertheless, we can see
no reason, in logic or in law, why such a finding may not be made
within the Patent Office....
[In defining "fraud" as used in Rule 56], we have not been left to
our own resources. We have been aided by the following
183. At the time this rule provided, in pertinent part: "Improper applications. . . . any
application fraudulenty [sic) filed or in connection with which any fraud is practiced or
attempted on the Patent Office, may be stricken from the files." Id. at 782 n.4.
184. Id. at 782.
185. Id. at 785.
186. Id. at 788.
187. Id. at 789-91.
188. Id. at 791.
189. Specifically, the court stated that it would first determine the standards of law the
Commissioner was required to apply, and then determine whether the evidence justified the
decision. Id.
190. Id. at 791-92.
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unquestionable logic in the Commissioner's opinion in In re
Heany:
if the Commissioner should find from evidence duly taken in
accordance with the law that an application or applications are
so permeated with fraud as to justify the opinion that any
patent or patents granted on those applications, whether
amended or not, would be annulled or set aside by a court of
[competent jurisdiction], on the ground that the patent was
obtained through fraud, then it would be the duty of the
Commissioner, under the law, to refuse, upon that ground, to
grant such a patent.
We take this to indicate that any conduct which will prevent the
enforcement of a patent after the patent issues should, if discovered
earlier, prevent the issuance of the patent. The only rational,
practical interpretation of the term "fraud" in Rule 56 which could
follow is that the term refers to the very same types of conduct
which the courts, in patent infringement suits, would hold
fraudulent.191
In other words, the court is stating no more than the following: in
reviewing a Commissioner's decision whether to strike an application
for "fraud," the court may, in its analysis of what constitutes fraud,
look to the types of conduct that have been held to render a patent
unenforceable in post-grant proceedings. This understanding is
consistent with the passage from Heany cited by the Norton court.
In re Heany considered allegations of fraud in an application
involved in an interference. 19 2 Heany, his attorney and the Assistant
Examiner conducting the examination of Heany's application were
charged by the Principal Examiner with removing pages from the
specification and replacing them with pages containing additional
disclosure.19 3 The application was abandoned following a divisional
filing, and the divisional application was involved in an
interference.194 Aware of the Principal Examiner's allegations, the
other parties to the interference petitioned the Commissioner,
asserting that "both the said applications of Heany are fraudulent or
so permeated with fraud that they should be stricken from the files of
191. Id. at 792 (citation omitted).
192. In re Heany, 171 0.G. 983 (1911).
193. Id. at 984-85.
194. Id.
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the Patent Office or treated as a nullity so far as concerns this
interference."19 5
The Commissioner concluded:
It would be a travesty, indeed, and against all legal principles to
permit a party to an interference to remain a party thereto [if the
involved applications were] fraudulent to such a degree that any
patent or patents granted [thereon] would be invalid and void on
the ground of fraud. A fraudulent application is in law no such
application as to justify the grant of a patent thereon, and the same
is true when an application contains an incomplete and inoperative
disclosure.196
The final clause, although seemingly out of place in a discussion of
such brazenly fraudulent conduct, is the beginning of the context to
the Commissioner's statement quoted by the Norton court. The
intervening language bridges post-issuance invalidity with pre-
issuance rejection by casting them as two sides of the same inquiry, in
the context not of fraud but rather of an incomplete or inoperative
disclosure.197 From this example, the decision generalized as follows:
The refusal of the Commissioner . .. to grant patents is always
based upon the fact that in [his] opinion ... the patent, if granted,
would be invalid. All reasons relied upon by the Commissioner ...
in [his] decisions refusing to grant patents to applicants, either in
ex parte or interference cases, may be pleaded in court against the
validity of patents.198
This language sets the stage for the Norton court's quotation, above,
which begins, "[i]t logically follows that if the Commissioner should
find . . .9199
Thus, under Heany and Norton, if the PTO becomes aware of an
applicant's conduct during prosecution that would, if raised as a
defense to the patent, give rise to a holding of unenforceability, the
PTO should on that ground refuse the application. The holdings are of
the propriety of agency action, and this is the context in which the
PTO's assertions, ostensibly attributable to these two cases, must be
understood:
195. Id. at 985.
196. Id. at 989.
197. See id.
198. Id.
199. Id. (emphasis added).
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Clearly, "fraud" practiced or attempted in an application which
issues as a patent is "fraud" practiced or attempted in connection
with any subsequent application to reissue that patent. The reissue
application and the patent are inseparable as far as questions of
"fraud," "inequitable conduct," or "violation of the duty of
disclosure" are concerned.200
Insofar as these statements provide the examiners with a rationale for
refusing to grant a reissue patent upon evidence of fraud, etc.
perpetrated during prosecution of the original application, they are
amply supported by the cited opinions. As general propositions of
law, however, the cited ground upon which they stand is illusory.
2. Curing Misrepresentations
Pure reason, aided by the foregoing analysis, suggests that
merely providing a previously withheld reference to the PTO during
reissue is sufficient to cure the original omission. After all, if
omission is the ailment, then provision is the cure, 2 0 1 and examiners
are presumed to perform their jobs correctly, 202 which includes review
of submitted information.20 3 As seen above, if the reference is
properly before the examiner and the patent issues, the inquiry into
the materiality of the reference is foreclosed. In contrast to providing
a reference to cure an omission, however, the question of curing a
misrepresentation is not resolved upon patent issuance following mere
supplemental provision of accurate information. In Rohm & Haas Co.
v. Crystal Chemical Co.,2 04 the Federal Circuit addressed the
distinction.
a. Rohm & Haas
In Rohm & Haas, the court considered under what
circumstances, if any, an applicant could cure a material
misrepresentation made to the PTO in the same prosecution.205 During
an interview, the patentee informed the examiner of omissions of test
data from its previously submitted affidavits, and supplied the omitted
200. See MPEP, supra note 75.
201. See, e.g., N. Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931, 938 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
("All the pertinent information was squarely before the examiner in a simple document.... the
examiner was free to reach his own conclusion.").
202. See supra note 88.
203. See supra note 75.
204. Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chemical Co., 722 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
205. See id.
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data and other related data in the patentee's possession.206 The district
court found that the patentee had corrected all of the "deficiencies" in
the prosecution that existed until then.20 7 On appeal, the Federal
Circuit addressed whether the patentee's conduct could have been
cured, and, if so, whether its conduct was sufficient to effect a cure.208
To the first question, the court answered in the affirmative:
Specifically, the narrow issue we now deal with is whether
voluntary efforts during prosecution by or on behalf of an
applicant, knowing that misrepresentations have been made to the
examiner of his application, can ever alleviate its effect. Taking
into account human frailty and all of the objectives of the patent
system, we think it desirable to permit misdeeds to be overcome
under certain limited circumstances.209
Thus, the Federal Circuit has recognized that "the objectives of the
patent system" are served when an applicant is given the opportunity
to correct a previous misrepresentation to the PTO. The court further
established requirements to do so. 2 10 The applicant who wishes to
overcome a misrepresentation must: (1) expressly advise the PTO of
its existence and state specifically where it occurs; (2) if the
misrepresentation is of one or more facts, advise the PTO what the
actual facts are and make it clear that further examination in light of
those facts may be required if any PTO action has been based on the
misrepresentation; and (3) on the basis of the new and factually
accurate record, establish patentability of the claimed subject
matter.211 Additionally, the court expressly stated that simply
submitting the accurate information was insufficient:
It does not suffice that one knowing of misrepresentations in an
application or in its prosecution merely supplies the examiner with
accurate facts without calling his attention to the untrue or
206. Id. at 1559.
207. Id.
208. "The questions presented by Crystal's allegation of fraud in the PTO are: 1. Did R &
H intentionally make material misrepresentations to the PTO? 2. If it did, could that conduct
have been 'cured' during prosecution by subsequent disclosure to the PTO before the patent
issued? 3. If R & H prosecution activities were illicit, yet could have been 'cured,' was R & H's
1973 interview disclosure sufficient to that end?" Id. at 1570. The court answered "yes" to the
first question. Id. at 1570-71.
209. Id. at 1571-72 (emphasis added). The court subsequently determined that Rohm &
Haas had not met the requirements. Id. at 1572.
210. Id. at 1572.
211. Id.
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misleading assertions sought to be overcome, leaving him to
formulate his own conclusions. 212
b. Applicability of Rohm & Haas to Reissue
The Rohm & Haas court explicitly did not address the
applicability of their ruling to post-issuance activity, 2 13 and district
courts have addressed the question with differing results. One court
concluded that cure under Rohm & Haas is not available to a reissue
applicant.2 14 However, the basis for this determination was, as in
Aventis, a misplaced reliance on Clark.2 15 Another court intimated
that attempted correction under Rohm & Haas during reissue is the
proper mechanism for curing a misrepresentation after grant, but it
assumed that the proceeding would be barred by § 251 and/or
Clark.216
As discussed above, in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-
Poulenc Rorer, Inc., the district court held that both the original '011
patent and the Re'277 patent had been obtained by inequitable
conduct.2 17 Inequitable conduct was held in the first instance because
RPR withheld the JACS article during prosecution of the '011
patent.2 18 The court further held that "[RPR's] failure to disclose the
JACS article during the prosecution of the 011 patent was not cured
by [its] subsequent disclosure of the JACS article late in the
prosecution of the [Re'277] patent." 2 19 Specifically, the court
analyzed RPR's actions under the Rohm & Haas factors and found
them insufficient to cure the inequitable conduct committed during
the original prosecution.220 In other words, the district court simply
assumed that the reasoning of Rohm & Haas applied to curative
actions taken during reissue.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1571 ("We are not dealing with the question of what, if anything, can be done
after the patent issued to alleviate the effect of misconduct.").
214. See Golden Valley Microwave Foods, Inc. v. Weaver Popcorn Co., 837 F. Supp.
1444, 1478 (N.D. Ind. 1992).
215. Id.
216. See Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Samsung Electronics Co., 24 F. Supp. 2d 537,
544-45 & n.26 (E.D. Va. 1998).
217. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 95-CV-8833-RPP, 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 480, at *53 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2002).
218. Id. at *53.
219. Id. at *54.
220. Id. at *54-58.
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The Federal Circuit has yet to address the propriety of this
assumption. As mentioned above, the Bristol-Myers court was silent
regarding the district court's Rohm & Haas analysis but simply noted
that "the examiner's allowance of the reissue patent after considering
the JACS article ... does not end the materiality inquiry."22' And, as
discussed earlier, the court deemed the materiality inquiry not ended
because they misapprehended the effect of the reissue patent grant. In
Molins, the question was not before the court as the patentee did not
assert that the subsequent citation of the reference during the
reexamination proceeding cured the failure to cite it during the
original prosecution.222
The Rohm & Haas court, while not addressing the post-grant
situation, weighed the relevant policy considerations. The defendant
had argued that "[o]nce fraud on the PTO has been committed, it
cannot be corrected." 22 3 In coming to the conclusion that the
defendant's view was too narrow, the court was conscious of the need
to balance competing considerations:
Surely, a very important policy consideration is to discourage all
manner of dishonest conduct in dealing with the PTO. At the same
time, the basic policy underlying the patent system is to encourage
the disclosure of inventions through issuance of patents. Another
policy of the system is to stimulate the investment of risk capital in
the commercialization of useful patentable inventions so that the
public gets some benefit from them, which may not occur in the
absence of some patent protection. Clearly, we are faced with
questions of both socioeconomic policy on the one hand, and
morals or ethics on the other. We think we should not so
emphasize either category as to forget the other.
Considering the overall objectives of the patent system, we think it
desirable that inventions meeting the statutory requirements for
patentability be patented and, therefore, we also think it desirable
to reserve the possibility of expiation of wrongdoing where an
221. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 326 F.3d 1226, 1237 (Fed.
Cir. 2003).
222. Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1183 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
223. See Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chemical Co., 722 F.2d 1556, 1571 (Fed. Cir.
1983). In effect, this is what the Aventis court held with respect to post-grant attempts at
correction.
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applicant chooses to take the necessary action on his own initiative
and to take it openly.224
Thus, the Federal Circuit's own analysis of policy considerations
recognizes the value in permitting patentees to correct their missteps
voluntarily. At the same time, the court has not proffered a
justification for differentiating between original patents and reissue
patents; and, as seen above, where they have treated the difference as
dispositive, it has been based on a misunderstanding of cited
precedent. There is therefore no reason grounded in policy or
precedent for denying a patentee the ability to correct a
misrepresentation under Rohm & Haas during a reissue proceeding.
The effect of granting a reissue patent following cure of a
misrepresentation should be the same as that following submission of
a previously withheld reference, namely, foreclosure into the
materiality of the misrepresentation. As with correcting omissions,
this foreclosure precludes both an inference of intent from materiality
and a holding of inequitable conduct that relies on materiality of the
misrepresentation. Unlike correcting omissions, however, mere
issuance of the patent does not demonstrate cure.225 Instead, there is a
separate question that must be answered if raised by the movant: did
the patentee actually cure the misrepresentation in the manner
prescribed by Rohm & Haas?2 26 If the answer is no, the patentee is in
the same position as before the reissue, i.e., there is an uncured
misrepresentation during prosecution that may lead to a judgment of
inequitable conduct. However, the additional facts relevant to both
materiality and intent generated by the reissue proceeding should be
considered by the court in balancing the equities to determine if a
judgment of inequitable conduct is warranted.
224. Id. at 1571-72 (emphasis added).
225. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
226. It is here that W. Elec. Co. v. Piezo Tech., Inc., 860 F.2d 428 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cited
in Molins, would be relevant. Western Electric sued Piezo for patent infringement, and Piezo in
defense alleged inequitable conduct. W. Elec. Co. v. Piezo Tech., Inc., CA No. 81-694-ORL-
CIV-ER, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13342, at *1 (E.D. Va. 1987), rev'd, 860 F.2d 428 (Fed. Cir.
1988). According to the district court, Western Electric argued in response that there could be no
inequitable conduct because the particular examiner in charge of the application "was an
independent and impartial expert who could recognize inaccurate or misleading statements
about prior art." Id. at *2. In rejecting Western Electric's argument, the Federal Circuit stated
that "[tlhe standard to be applied is not whether a particular examiner would consider the
material to be important, or in this case whether he would be misled by alleged
misrepresentations; rather it is that of a 'reasonable examiner.' Inquiry into the importance that
Examiner Nussbaum may have placed on the representations . .. is therefore wholly irrelevant."
W. Elec., 860 F.2d at 433.
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3. Distinguishing Omissions from Misrepresentations
Given the disparity in procedures required to cure, it warrants
acknowledging that omissions and misrepresentations are not always
easily distinguished. Where the allegation of inequitable conduct is
based upon mere withholding of a document, the determination of
omission should be straightforward. Similarly, an affirmative
misrepresentation-a statement offered by the patentee that a
particular assertion is true-should be easily determined to be a
misrepresentation. The difficulty arises when an item of information,
in contrast to an entire document, is withheld. Depending on the facts,
the withholding could legitimately be characterized as either.2 27
Undoubtedly, the significantly higher hurdle needed to overcome a
misrepresentation versus an omission will prompt accused infringers
to argue for the former, while patentees will invariably argue for the
latter. This is already the state of the law, however. This article
simply argues that cures attempted during reissue should not be
treated differently.
F. Timing
As seen in Clark, the timing of reissue relative to judgment is an
important consideration in determining the effect of the reissue
proceeding on the question of inequitable conduct. The Clark court
held that a reissue application filed after a judgment of inequitable
conduct could not rehabilitate the unenforceable patent.2 28 However,
as noted earlier, the court explicitly left unanswered the question of
whether reissue could be so employed prior to judgment.
Additionally, courts should consider the timing of the complaint
relative to reissue application filing, the taking of corrective action
(e.g., submitting a previously withheld reference), and reissue patent
issuance. In one aspect, inasmuch as inequitable conduct is an
equitable doctrine, courts should have the discretion not to entertain
mere delay tactics on the part of patentees. But further, the timing of
these events should dictate the analysis used to assess the effect of
reissue on the inequitable conduct determination. The effect of timing
on the analysis is explored below in several scenarios. In each case
227. See, e.g., the arguments presented in Amgen, Inc. v. Ariad Pharms., Inc., 577 F. Supp.
2d 695, 721-22 (D. Del. 2008); see also Applied Materials, Inc. v. Advanced Semiconductor
Materials, Inc., No. C-92-20643-RMW, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17569, at *9-10 (N.D. Cal.
April 18, 1994).
228. In re Clark, 522 F.2d 623, 628 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
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the conduct at issue is the withholding of a reference, but the analysis
may be generalized to any conduct.
Scenario 1. Complaint Filed After Filing of the Reissue
Application and Submission of the Reference
The scenario in which reissue patent issuance precedes filing of
the complaint presents the strongest case for permitting the patentee
to benefit from having submitted the reference. The patentee has
yielded the presumption of validity and thereby risked losing his
claims, and he has brought the previously withheld reference to the
attention of the Patent Office of his own accord. He has done this
prior to asserting the patent against an accused infringer, and thus has
not sought to take advantage of his prior omission. Specifically, he
has not sought to exploit the deterrent benefit by initiating litigation
prior to revealing the existence of the reference. Finally, irrespective
of the materiality of the reference, issuance of the reissue patent
should assuage all concerned that the PTO had issued a patent without
having been aware of information in the patentee's possession.
If the reissue application is still pending when the complaint is
filed, the analysis is largely the same inasmuch as the essential
elements listed in the preceding paragraph are present. The only
difference is that the PTO has not yet determined that the patentee is
entitled to his reissue claims. There are sufficient reasons for the
district court to stay litigation until reissue prosecution is concluded;
the above argument suggests one more. A complete prosecution
would enable the court to correctly adjudicate the question of
inequitable conduct: if the reissue patent is granted with no
concession required of the patentee on account of the reference, the
court can properly refuse to consider its prior omission as a basis for
an allegation of inequitable conduct, even with a showing that the
omission was intentional.
Scenario 2. Complaint Filed Before Submission of the
Reference
The policy justifications for the conclusion are weakened when
the complaint is filed before the reference is submitted to the PTO. In
this scenario it is not clear that the patentee has not sought to exploit
the deterrent benefit. The defendant, possibly unaware of the
reference, might decide to settle the case before the existence of the
reference is revealed. In such a situation, the equities may best be
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served by allowing an allegation of inequitable conduct for the
original omission to proceed.
It is important to point out that the complaint in question must be
the first complaint filed to enforce the patent.2 29 Assume that in the
situation just described the defendant decides to settle the case
unaware of the existence of the withheld reference. Reissue
prosecution concludes and a reissue patent is granted. The patentee
then seeks to enforce the reissue patent against a second defendant,
who is aware of the reference from her reading of the reissue
prosecution history. The equities do not favor precluding the second
defendant from alleging inequitable conduct for the prior omission, as
in Scenario 1. The patentee exploited the deterrent benefit before it
was clear he was entitled to it, and he therefore should not be
permitted to use his untimely corrective action as a shield.
The conclusion is the same a fortiori when the reference is
independently discovered by the defendant and forms the basis for his
affirmative defense of unenforceability for inequitable conduct. Here
the patentee has taken no corrective action before asserting his patent,
and the submission of the reference at this point is properly
considered an avoidance tactic. There is no policy justification for
permitting the patentee to escape inquiry into his earlier conduct
under these circumstances.230 Moreover, allowing him to do so may
create an incentive to withhold the reference during reissue in the
hope that it will not be discovered, and submitting it only when its
existence is known to all parties.
At the same time, courts need not disregard the outcome of a
reissue proceeding. This was precisely the situation in Am. Hoist &
Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons,2 3 1 discussed above in the context of no-
defect reissue. There, the "reissue" was filed only after the existence
of the art was revealed in the defendant's motions.2 32 The court's
229. This includes a legitimate declaratory judgment complaint filed by a potential
defendant. The patentee's conduct, if it rises to the level of conferring jurisdiction on a
declaratory judgment plaintiff, should be seen as an attempt to exploit the deterrent benefit
sufficient to deprive the patentee of the full benefit of post-grant review.
230. Young v. Lumenis, Inc., No. 2:03-cv-655, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13585, at *35 n.19
(S.D. Ohio March 28, 2006) ("Plaintiffs recent submission does not cure his misconduct. As an
initial matter, Plaintiff did not provide the updated information to the PTO until Defendant filed
this motion.") (citing Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chem. Co., 722 F.2d 1556, 1572 (Fed. Cir.
1983) for the requirement that the patentee "take the necessary action on his own initiative").
231. Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
232. See supra notes 140 and 141 and accompanying text.
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instruction to the jury to reconsider materiality in light of the PTO's
assessment233 strikes a reasonable balance between "socioeconomic
policy on the one hand, and morals or ethics on the other."2 34
There is also a practical reason not to initiate suit until the
reissue patent is granted. Once the patent issues, the PTO has no
jurisdiction over it.235 However, as discussed in Section III.E.1.b.,
above: (1) the PTO has the authority to refuse patent grant "on an
application in connection with which fraud on the Office was
practiced or attempted or the duty of disclosure was violated through
bad faith or intentional misconduct;" 23 6 and (2) the PTO does not
distinguish between the original and reissue applications with regard
to inequitable conduct and violations of the duty of disclosure. These
facts become critical when recalling the reissue applicant's duty to
inform the PTO of concurrent proceedings.2 37 Allegations by an
accused infringer of the patentee's fraudulent conduct during original
prosecution will undoubtedly raise questions within the PTO and may
prevent the PTO from granting the reissue.
G. Reconsidering Materiality
Consistent with American Hoist, the granting of a reissue patent
following submission of a reference should at the very least affect the
determination of the reference's materiality. Determination of the
omitted information's materiality is tied to the importance a
reasonable examiner would attach to it. When that information is
before the PTO, the examiner's consideration and disposition of it-
acknowledging it without comment, issuing a rejection over it, or
stating in her reasons for allowance what it does not teach-should
inform the court's evaluation of its materiality.
This view was ostensibly adopted by the Federal Circuit in
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc. 238 As
233. Am. Hoist & Derrick Co., 725 F.2d at 1362-63.
234. Rohm & Haas, 722 F.2d at 1571.
235. In re Dien, 680 F.2d 151, 154 (citing McCormick Harvesting Machine Co. v.
Aultman, 169 U.S. 606, 608-09 (1898)).
236. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2009).
237. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.178(b) ("In any reissue application before the Office, the applicant
must call to the attention of the Office any prior or concurrent proceedings in which the patent
(for which reissue is requested) is or was involved, such as interferences, reissues,
reexaminations, or litigations and the results of such proceedings.").
238. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 326 F.3d 1226 (Fed Cir.
2003).
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discussed above, the district court found that RPR failed to provide
material information to the PTO by not submitting the JACS article
during prosecution of the original patent despite submitting it during
239reissue.23 On review, the Federal Circuit made the following
observation:
To be sure, the fact that the JACS article was disclosed to the
examiner in the reissue prosecution but did not lead the examiner
to reject the application is relevant evidence favoring RPR with
regard to the issue of materiality.240
Thereafter, the court proceeded to find that the JACS article was
nonetheless "material." 24 1 After upholding the district court's finding
of deceptive intent, the court affirmed the judgment of inequitable
conduct.24 2
However, the Federal Circuit should have remanded to the
district court to revisit its inequitable conduct holding. After all,
inequitable conduct requires not only threshold levels of materiality
and intent, but also a "determin[ation] whether the questioned conduct
amounts to inequitable conduct by balancing the levels of materiality
and intent, with a greater showing of one factor allowing a lesser
showing of the other."2 43 Logic dictates that a lesser showing of one
factor requires a greater showing of the other.
However, the district court was not given the opportunity to
reassess the degree of materiality of the JACS article in view of the
reissue allowance, nor did it undertake this assessment in its original
opinion. Instead, the district court determined that RPR had not cured
the original omission by submission during reissue. 244 Having found
that the omission had not been cured, the district court did not
determine whether the reissue proceeding affected the degree of
materiality of the JACS article. An allegation of inequitable conduct
is a serious charge, and an affirmative judgment has drastic
consequences. 24 5 Given the severity of the consequences, a court
239. Id. at 1234.
240. Id. at 1236 (citing In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 178 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
241. Id. at 1236-39.
242. Id. at 1239-42.
243. See Digital Control, Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1313 (citing Union
Pac. Res. Co. v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., 236 F.3d 684, 693 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (emphasis
added)).
244. Bristol-Myers, 326 F.3d at 1239-40.
245. See, e.g., Plaintiffs-Appellants' Combined Petition for Panel Rehearing and
Rehearing En Banc at vi, Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharm., 438 F.3d 1123 (Fed. Cir. Jun. 21,
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should use its equitable discretion to at least consider all of the facts
known to it.246
IV. APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED ANALYSIS
Applying the proposed analysis to the facts in Aventis might
have led to a different outcome. No claims were amended in
247
substance during reissue, and Aventis took action to correct
Example 6 prior to filing suit, 24 8 so there was not an attempt to exploit
the deterrent benefit. At the same time, the reissue patent had not yet
issued, so Aventis was not entitled to the full benefit of the PTO's
assessment of the information as corrected.
The district court could have stayed the litigation until the
reissue was concluded, but at the very least the court should have
considered the PTO's assessment of the information's materiality in
its determination of inequitable conduct, as the reissue patent issued
prior to judgment.2 49 Irrespective of the propriety of the reissue, a new
finding regarding materiality would have required a reconsideration
of the holding of unenforceability for inequitable conduct, inasmuch
as a lesser finding of materiality requires a greater finding of intent.25 0
Moreover, because intent is generally inferred from surrounding facts
and circumstances,25 1 it follows that a finding of less materiality may
2005) (Nos. 04-1189, 04-1347, 04-1357) 2005 WL 3968475 (noting that 67 groups of plaintiffs
filed actions alleging civil fraud and violation of state and federal antitrust laws, and that the
central allegation in each case was based on the trial court's holding that Purdue's patents were
unenforceable due to inequitable conduct).
246. The Aventis majority did not engage in any such reconsideration of materiality despite
the granting of the reissue patent. In contrast, the dissent pointed out, "The USPTO granted the
reissue a day before the district court judge granted Teva and Amphastar's summary judgment
motion that the '618 patent was unenforceable. Aventis did not have the opportunity to make
this argument to the trial judge. This record does not prevent this court, however, from
considering all this information in evaluating the inequitable conduct finding." Aventis Pharma
S.A. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 525 F.3d 1334, 1352 (Rader, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
247. Two claims were corrected for typographical errors, and one dependent claim was
canceled.
248. Aventis, 525 F.3d at 1352.
249. The dissent made the point that, "The patent reissued . . . with all of the original
independent claims, but without example 6. The half-life data were apparently not even
necessary for patentability. The USPTO determined that the Debrie LMWH was inventive over
the prior art Mardiguian LMWH without relying on the controversial half-life data from
example 6." Id. at 1352 (Rader, J., dissenting).
250. This follows from the court's recitation that "[t]he more material the omission or
misrepresentation, the less intent that must be shown to elicit a finding of inequitable conduct."
Id. at 1344 (citations omitted).
251. See id.
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lead to a finding of less intent.252 As with materiality, a finding of a
lower level of intent would affect the ultimate determination of
inequitable conduct.
If we assume the finding of deceptive intent was correct, we then
must consider whether the reissue was proper. As discussed above:
(1) the finding of inequitable conduct was premised on Example 6 of
the '618 patent's specification and statements concerning the
Example by Dr. Uzan; and (2) the reissue application expressly
disavowed any reliance on Example 6 and the portions of Dr. Uzan's
declarations relating to Example 6. However, unlike the scenarios
discussed in the previous section, there was no clear distinction
between the correction in the reissue and the basis for the holding of
inequitable conduct: the latter concerned one aspect of Example 6, but
the correction addressed the entirety of the Example. Thus, a correct
finding of deceptive intent may well have nullified the reissue as
improper.
The next question is whether one could have prosecuted the
reissue application to provide the required distinction. The stated error
concerned one statement and various percentages reported in Example
6.253 On the other hand, the basis for inequitable conduct was the non-
disclosure of the dosage differences used in the comparisons with the
EP '144 composition both in Example 6 and in Dr. Uzan's
declarations. As long as there was no deceptive intent concerning the
statement and percentage errors, those errors could still serve as a
proper basis for reissue. At the same time, the dosage information
could have been provided to the examiner. And because the dosage
information presumably would not have required a concession by the
Applicant-after all, the claims were issued without substantive
amendment and without any of the information from Example 6 or
the relevant sections of the declarations-the omission would not
252. See id. ("The essence of Aventis's argument is that ... the dosage information is not
material. We have previously determined, however, that the dosage information was material to
patentability. Nevertheless, because materiality and intent to deceive are necessarily
intertwined, we will consider the merits of Aventis's argument with respect to deceptive
intent.") (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
253. The reissue declaration states, in pertinent part, "At least one error forming the basis
of this reissue involves Example 6 of the specification. That example contains mistakes in
several percentages reported. Specifically, at col. 9, lines 47-50, Example 6 identifies three
percentages: 75%, 45%, and 75%. I believe that these percentages should have been written as
67%, 42%, and 50%, respectively. Also, at col. 9, line 46, Example 6 mistakenly refers to
'mixtures produced in Examples 3 and 4.'" U.S. Patent Appl. No. 10/430,435, Reissue
Declaration, at T 5 (filed May 7, 2003).
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have been considered an "error" under § 251, thereby rendering
irrelevant the Applicant's intent. Whether provision of the dosage
information would have been considered correction of an omission
requiring mere disclosure or correction of a misrepresentation
requiring satisfaction of Rohm & Haas could have been argued before
the court. But under the Federal Circuit's treatment, neither avenue
for correction was available to the patentee.
The opportunity for prospective cure discussed in this article is
admittedly narrow. Nonetheless, in view of the returning plague,254
the proposed analysis is applicable to a number of fact patterns. In
Ferring v. Barr Labs.,255 inequitable conduct was premised on the
failure to disclose the relationship between the patentee and several
declarants whose affidavits were relied on to obtain the patent.256 In
Hoffman-La Roche v. Promega, 257 the Federal Circuit upheld the trial
court's findings of materiality and intent based on the implicit
representation that an example described in the past tense was
actually performed as written and the results described were actually
obtained for that example.258 In both cases a diligent patentee could
have utilized a reissue application to present such facts to the PTO for
consideration. 25 9 The application of the proposed analysis might well
have led to an outcome more just to the patentee and more aligned
with the public's interest.
V. CONCLUSION
Reissue applications are an important mechanism for post-grant
corrections of patents. They are useful not merely for correcting
concrete errors, but also for providing the PTO with information
whose existence or import is newly discovered. In Aventis v.
Amphastar,2 60 the Federal Circuit declined to consider whether the
applicant's corrective action in prosecuting a reissue application
should have affected the judgment of inequitable conduct. The
254. See supra note 151.
255. Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 437 F.3d 1181 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
256. See id. at 1187-94.
257. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
258. Id. at 1363-68. However, the Court vacated the holding of unenforceability because
the trial court, while finding both materiality and intent, had not determined whether, under all
the circumstances, the severe sanction of holding the patent unenforceable was warranted. Id. at
1372.
259. This statement assumes a proper, independent basis for reissue existed.
260. Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 525 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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authority the court relied on in its refusal to consider the reissue not
only fails to support the court's position, but explicitly declines to
even address it. Thus, there is not a "well-settled principle" that
resolves the issue, but a void it is the court's duty to fill. This article
suggests one possible analytical framework to fill that void; but
however the court ultimately decides the matter, it must not avoid its
responsibility to address it. With the return of the inequitable conduct
plague, and the severity of such a judgment's consequences, 261 the
stakes have never been higher.
261. See In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 585 F.3d 677, 684-92 (2d Cir.
2009) (holding that direct purchasers of a patented product have standing to bring a Walker
Process claim against the patentee following a holding that the patent is unenforceable for
inequitable conduct).
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APPENDIX. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN INTERMOUNTAIN RESEARCH
As noted in the main article, MPEP § 2012 states: "[i]t is clear
that 'fraud' cannot be purged through the reissue process. See
conclusions of Law 89 and 91 in Intermountain Research and Eng'g
Co. v. Hercules Inc., 171 U.S.P.Q. 577, 631-32 (C.D. Cal. 1971)."
Section III.E.1.a. asserts that the citations mustered to support this
statement either simply do not support it, or the context in which they
were cited do not support the PTO's reliance on them. This Appendix
justifies the assertion with a detailed analysis of the two conclusions
of law.
A. Conclusion ofLaw 91
91. No valid patent can issue on the application filed to reissue the
'695 patent. No such patent, if issued, is enforceable against the
defendants here for the same reasons that the '695 patent is
unenforceable against them. Conclusions of Law 5, 7, 10 to 14, 16
to 18, 76 to 79, 81 and 84; RSJ, Conclusions of Law 9 to 20; Helen
Curtis Industries v. Sales Affiliates, 247 F2d 940, 942, 946, 114
USPQ 469, 470, 472-473 (2 Cir. 1957); B. F. Goodrich Co. v.
American Lakes Paper Co., 23 FSupp. 682, 684-5, 38 USPQ 69,
71-73 (D. Del. 1938); Rancourt v. Panco Rubber Co., 67 F.2d 790,
19 USPQ 192 (1 Cir. 1933); Mills Alloys v. Stoody Co., 94 F2d
413, 36 USPQ 287 (9 Cir. 1938), cert. den. 304 U.S. 573, 37 USPQ
844; Vapor Car Heating Co. v. Gold Car Heating & Lighting, 7
F.2d 284 (2 Cir. 1925), cert. den. 268 U.S. 705.262
The Intermountain Research court's opinion regarding the
enforceability of a patent granted on the pending reissue application at
issue was informed by its understanding of the factual deficiencies
shared by the underlying patent and the reissue application. 263 The
court's citations to the above cases support its conclusion concerning
the application to reissue the Re'695 patent, but do not support the
PTO's broader reliance on them.
Rancourt v. Panco Rubber Co. and B.F. Goodrich Co. v.
American Lakes Paper Co. each concerned reissue in the context of
res judicata.26 In each case, the reissue plaintiff was estopped from
262. Intermountain Research & Eng'g Co, Inc. v. Hercules, Inc., 171 U.S.P.Q. 577, 632
(C.D. Cal. 1971).
263. See supra Part III.E. L.a.
264. See Rancourt v. Panco Rubber Co., 67 F.2d 790, 792 (1st Cir. 1933); B.F. Goodrich
Co. v. American Lakes Paper Co., 23 F. Supp. 682, 684-85 (D. Del. 1938).
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asserting infringement of the reissue patent by an earlier judgment
that the original patent was invalid. In Rancourt, the district court had
previously held the original patent invalid "as containing no
patentable invention." 2 65 The patentee did not appeal the ruling, but
thereafter obtained a reissue patent and brought an equivalent
infringement action.2 66 The district court held that the issue of the
patent's invalidity was barred by res judicata, and dismissed the
action.267 The First Circuit affirmed after the district court's finding
on remand that "the invention described in the reissue patent was the
same as that described in the original patent," stating that "[c]learly a
reissue patent for the same machine involving the same invention
cannot avail the plaintiff in a new suit." 26 8
Similarly, in B.F. Goodrich, in an action for infringement of the
original patent, the district court had held the patent invalid for prior
use and for "not disclos[ing] invention over .. . the prior art," a ruling
affirmed by the Seventh Circuit.2 6 9 The patentee subsequently
obtained a reissue patent, and in the considered action for
infringement of the reissue patent the court analyzed the effect of the
prior judgment. 27 0 Finding that the parties in suit were the same as in
the earlier litigation, and that the reissue claims did not differ from the
original claims in any material respect, the court held that the earlier
decision holding the original patent invalid was res judicata between
the parties with respect to the reissue patent.2 7'
Like Intermountain Research, both Rancourt and B.F. Goodrich
are fact-specific cases. It is notable in Rancourt that the First Circuit
did not affirm the district court's dismissal until the court determined,
after remand, that the invention in the reissue was the same as that in
the original patent.2 72 Similarly, the B.F. Goodrich court specifically
made a finding that the reissue claims did not differ from the original
claims "in any material respect" before holding that res judicata
applied. 27 3 These are recognitions of factual matters-that the reissue
265. Rancourt, 67 F.2d at 792. The First Circuit also considered whether the reissue had
been timely filed, and affirmed the district court's dismissal on this ground. Id.
266. Id. at 791.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. B. F. Goodrich Co., 23 F. Supp. at 683.
270. Id. at 683-85.
271. Id. at 685.
272. Rancourt, 67 F.2d at 791.
273. B.F. Goodrich Co., 23 F. Supp. at 685.
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patents did not differ in material respects, not that they could not
differ in material respects-much less that any such inquiry into the
nature of their differences would be inconsequential. On the contrary,
the careful inquiry into the nature of their differences (or lack thereof)
suggests that the factual considerations were dispositive.
Helene Curtis Indus. v. Sales Affiliates concerned not a reissue
patent but rather a continuation-in-part ("CIP"), and, similar to
Rancourt and B.F. Goodrich, the issue was one of issue preclusion
rather than fraud.2 74 In a declaratory judgment action, a district court
held the initial patent invalid, adopting the Special Master's
recommended grounds of "inadequate disclosure, lack of invention,
anticipation and indefiniteness."275 The court further enjoined the
patentee from bringing suit or threatening to bring suit for
infringement of the patent against the declaratory judgment plaintiffs
or their customers. 2 76 Later, an earlier-filed CIP of the initial patent 277
was transferred from the patentee to a shell corporation, and the
application eventually issued as the CIP patent.27 8 The shell company
sued the original plaintiffs' customers for infringement of the CIP
patent. 279
At trial, the accused infringers' allegations were that the CIP
patent was invalid for the same reasons as the initial patent, and that
the infringement suits by the shell company were simply a scheme to
circumvent the injunction. 2 80 Notwithstanding the Special Master's
findings regarding invalidity, the district court, citing the presumption
of validity attaching to each patent, decided that the validity of the
CIP patent must be "litigated anew in a plenary suit."2 81 The Second
Circuit disagreed, and held that if the district court confirmed the
findings that the CIP patent was invalid for substantially the same
reasons as the initial patent, and that the shell corporation was "a
mere alter ego" of the initial patentee, then the district court should
issue an appropriate supplemental injunction.282 As with the
274. See Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 247 F.2d 940, 942 (2d Cir.
1957).
275. Id. at 943.
276. Id.
277. That is, a CIP of the application that issued as the initial patent.
278. Helene Curtis, 247 F.2d at 943.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 943-44.
281. Id. at 944.
282. Id. at 945-46.
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previously discussed cases, this case supports Intermountain
Research's reliance on it insofar as factual issues are concerned, but
the PTO's employment of it in the context of purging fraud through
reissue must fail.
Like Helene Curtis, neither Mills Alloys nor Vapor Car Heating
concerned reissue, but rather each addressed the effect of an earlier
ruling on a patent related to the patent-in-suit. In Mills Alloys, the
Ninth Circuit had earlier held the claims in a patent to a welding rod
"void for lack of invention."2 83 In the action at issue, the Special
Master had determined that the patent-in-suit, which was directed to
the use of the welding rod for its described purpose, was valid over
the defendant's assertion that res judicata demanded its invalidity.284
In reversing, the appeals court looked to matters of fact:
One of the issues in the former case was the factual one of
invention.... whether the proposed use of the welding rod was
new or old was inherent in the question of invention in the welding
rod itself.... where the litigation in each case turns upon the
question of the novelty of the manner of use, the adjudication of
invalidity of the process (or manner of use) patent follows as an
inevitable conclusion from the finding of lack of novelty in the
product patent... . [The lack of invention in the process claims]
was conclusively established by the prior finding and decree.285
Even if res judicata did not apply, the court continued, they would
"now point out some of the facts of prior use in proof herein which
would cause us to adhere to our former ruling."286
Vapor Car Heating Co. v. Gold Car Heating & Lighting was
decided on the same principle.287 The patentee had earlier sued the
defendant for infringement of a patent directed to a low pressure
heating system, and at trial the relevant claims were held invalid over
the prior art.288 In the infringement action under review, the patent-in-
suit was directed to a method of heating using the same apparatus
claimed in the earlier, invalidated patent.2 89 In holding the claims at
issue invalid, the Second Circuit restricted its inquiry to the facts:
283. Mills Alloys, Inc. v. Stoody Co., 94 F.2d 413, 413-14 (9th Cir. 1938).
284. Id. at 415.
285. Id. (emphasis added).
286. Id. at 417 (emphasis added).
287. See Vapor Car Heating Co., Inc. v. Gold Car Heating & Lighting Co., 7 F.2d 284 (2d
Cir. 1925).
288. Id. at 288.
289. Id. at 286-87.
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The earlier patent has been adjudicated void, and it is argued by
the appellee that it is res adjudicata as to the method patent. Both
patents are based on [the same mechanism, the same construction
and parts, alike descriptions of the apparatus and its operation
and] .. . are both concerned with the vapor system of steam
heating. The apparatus operates necessarily according to this vapor
system. The operation of the apparatus patent is all that is
described in the claims of the patent in suit.... Because the
essential fact at issue in the present case is the same as that which
was decided in appellee's favor in a previous case, the conclusion
follows that the question is res adjudicata ....
[I]n the former suit the ultimate point decided. . . rested upon the
ground that the vapor system was old, being anticipated by the
prior art ... and [thereby] covered the precise point which would
have been decided if the patent for the art now sued upon was
before the court.290
B. Conclusion ofLaw 89
89. The procurement of the '695 Reissue Patent by fraud on the
Patent Office cannot be cured by application to the Patent Office to
reissue the '695 patent. 35 U.S.C. § 251; Staude v. Bendix Products
Corporation, 26 F.Supp. 901, 41 USPQ 571 (N.D. Ind. 1939),
aff'd. 110 F.2d 484, 44 USPQ 633 (7 Cir. 1940). To be entitled to
reissue a patent, "the patentee must be guilty of no fraud or
deception". Wichita Visible Gasoline Pump Co. v. Clear Vision
Pump Co., 19 F.2d 435 (8 Cir. 1927), cert. den. 275 U.S. 530;
National Nut Co. v. Sontag Chain Stores Co., 107 F2d 318, 43
USPQ 302 (9 Cir. 1939), rev'd on other grounds, 310 U.S. 281, 45
USPQ 448 (1940).291
As with Conclusion of Law 91, the cases cited in Conclusion of Law
89 fail to support the PTO's broad statements. While the cases in the
previous Conclusion supported the district court's usage as a factual
matter, and only as a factual matter, the cases in Conclusion 89
simply miss the point. Each case is now discussed in turn.
Staude v. Bendix Products Corp. considered enforcement of a
reissue patent claim against an accused infringer.29 2 The defendant
asserted both non-infringement and that the reissue patent was void as
290. Id. at 286-87.
291. Intermountain Research & Eng'g Co, Inc. v. Hercules, Inc., 171 U.S.P.Q. 577, 631.
(C.D. Cal. 1971).
292. See Staude v. Bendix Prod. Corp., 26 F. Supp. 901 (N.D. Ind. 1939).
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having been "improvidently granted."2 93 The ground for the second
contention was not recited, other than the assertion that "it did not
comply with the United States statutes and rules of practice of the
Patent Office."294 Holding that the defendant did not infringe the
patent, the court found it unnecessary to address the contention of
improper grant.295 Nevertheless, in dictum, the court stated that
"where the reissue is improvidently and illegally granted or where it
is tainted with fraud, it is void ab initio, and a claim even though
brought forward from the original patent goes out with the reissue."296
However, the court's language is not specific to fraud occurring
during prosecution of the original application. On the contrary, the
context of the statement-that the reissue was "tainted with fraud"-
implies, if anything, that the fraud was appurtenant to the reissue
itself. Either way, this case does not address whether reissue can cure
fraud committed during prosecution of the original application.
Wichita Visible Gasoline Pump Co. v. Clear Vision Pump Co.
and National Nut Co. v. Sontag Chain Stores Co. each considered the
propriety of a reissue patent sued upon.2 97 Addressing the grounds for
reissue, the Wichita court explained:
The ground upon which reissue is permissible is inadvertence,
accident, or mistake.... Of course, the patentee must be guilty of
no fraud or deception. If the only object of the reissue is to enlarge
the claims, in order to embrace a noninfringing device which has
come into legitimate use, the reissue is not justified, at least on that
ground alone ... and this also bears upon the question of whether
application was made within a reasonable time ... 298
The court held the reissue improper, stating that "the reissue was not
applied for within a reasonable time, nor upon a legitimate ground" 299
and "its object was to stifle competition from this source."oo The
court specifically noted that "[i]t was not until [the plaintiff]
293. Id. at 902.
294. Id. at 903.
295. Id. Appropriately, the Seventh Circuit's opinion affirming the district court did not
discuss the fraud allegation, and instead discussed only infringement. See Staude v. Bendix
Prod. Corp., 110 F.2d 484, 484-85 (7th Cir. 1940).
296. Staude, 26 F. Supp. at 903.
297. See Wichita Visible Gasoline Pump Co. v. Clear Vision Pump Co., 19 F.2d 435, 436
(8th Cir. 1927); Nat'l Nut Co. v. Sontag Chain Stores Co., 107 F.2d 318, 321 (9th Cir. 1939).
298. Wichita, 19 F.2d at 438.
299. Id.
300. Id.
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discovered [the defendant's] device that it took any steps to make its
patent cover [the defendant's] structure."30 1
Similarly, in National Nut, the defendant alleged impropriety3 0 2
of the reissue on several grounds, namely, that "the error in the
original did not arise from 'inadvertence, accident, or mistake' as
required by the statute... that the reissue was for a 'different
invention;' that the original patent was not 'inoperative;' and that
'fraudulent or deceptive intent' was not absent in the application for
reissue." 30 3 The court summarily dispensed with the allegation of
fraud:
Defendant ... contends that since the application for reissue was
filed after the first suit herein was instituted,304 and after it was
discovered that the original claims were not broad enough to
include defendant's device, that fact is evidence of "fraudulent or
deceptive intention." We do not agree with defendant in this
contention.
We find no evidence in the record indicating a fraudulent intent on
the part of the patentee in unnecessarily limiting the claims in his
original application. 305
Neither case thus supports the broad proposition attributed to it
by the Intermountain Research court. No issue of fraud was discussed
in Wichita, and the declaration of the need for the patentee to be free
of fraud and deception can be fairly read as reciting no more than
what the statute requires, namely, that "the error has arisen by
inadvertence, accident, or mistake, and without any fraudulent or
deceptive intention. ... This is especially evident in the National
Nut court's discussion of the allegation that the patentee's asserted
error did not arise from "inadvertence, accident, or mistake":
[I]t is obvious that the words 'inadvertence or mistake' are used in
the statute as the antitheses to 'fraudulent intent', and that in the
301. Id.
302. The opinion refers to the "invalidity" of the reissue. However, the stated allegations
are clearly directed at the propriety of the reissue, although the defendant also raised the
defenses of "anticipation and the prior art." Nat'l Nut, 107 F.2d at 330.
303. Id.
304. The patentee initially brought suit for infringement of the original patent. Shortly
thereafter, the patentee filed for and obtained a reissue patent, which was then substituted (in
effect) for the original patent. Id. at 321.
305. Id. at 331.
306. Id. at 330 n.2. Admittedly, the citation refers to the statute as amended the year after
the Wichita decision, but nonetheless includes the relevant requirement.
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absence of fraud the failure of an inventor or his solicitor to put the
claims in such form as will cover the entire invention is
'inadvertence', within the meaning of the statute .... 307
Thus, the only "fraud" at issue in National Nut was the
patentee's conduct in presenting claims in reissue broad enough to
encompass the defendant's device after filing suit on the original
patent. This is not fraud or inequitable conduct as understood today.308
307. Id. at 330-3 1.
308. See Mov, supra note 64, at § 16:105.
